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SOME ASPECTS OF ENFORCEABILITY OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
A COMPARATIVE SUMMARY
BARBARA KULZER*
From the standpoint of international relations, nothing could be more
advantageous than the recognition of foreign judgments; but this
ideal goal cannot be attained until the various states achieve some
agreement on the principles controlling the distribution of civil juris-
diction. At present each nation is at liberty to determine not only the
limits upon the exercise of jurisdiction by its own courts, but also the
range of jurisdiction which it is willing to concede to foreign states.'
I. INTRODUCTION
N recent years, steps have been taken both in this counrty and abroad toward
achieving "some agreement on the principles controlling the distribution
of civil jurisdiction," and toward assuring that domestic judgments will receive
recognition and enforcement in other countries. Certainly the growth of
international business contacts (due in large part to the success of the European
Economic Community) makes such developments highly desirable, since the
expected corollary of increased business activity is an increase in the in-
cidence of litigation with international aspects.2 The enforcement of foreign
money judgments has not as yet kept pace with economic activity although
the prevailing rules, problems and deficiencies have long been the subject of
much criticism and commentary.3 This failure of enforcement is particularly
* LL.B, Rutgers; Candidate for LL.M., Columbia; Assistant Professor of Law, School
of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, 50 Cornell L.Q.
5, 22-23 (1964).
2. In 1941, Professor Nussbaum, believing that conflicts cases of an international type
were rare in the United States, consulted the American Digest System for the period 1896-
1936 and found, aside from divorce matters, 63 cases involving foreign judgments, only 26
of which sought recognition and enforcement. Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judg-
ments, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221, 237-38 (1941). A check of the Decennial Digests from 1936
to 1966 for in personam judgments from courts of foreign countries shows fewer than 100judgments, including divorces, and not limited to those for which recognition and enforce-
ment were sought. Apparently, questions of recognition and enforcement are still "much
rarer, indeed, than one should expect in view of the size of the country and its tremendous
international activities in industry, commerce and financing." Id. at 237. The rarity may be
explained in part by the difficulties of obtaining recognition and enforcement. See also Reese,
The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783 (1950).
3. See, e.g., Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367 (1963); Lorenzen, The
Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad, 29 Yale L.J. 188 (1919); Nadelmann, Non-
Recognition of American Money-Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L.
Rev. 236 (1957); Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221
(1941); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L.
Rev. 783 (1950); Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law,
33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (1935). For articles dealing with the problems in a larger or a more
specific context, see, e.g., Smit & Miller, International Cooperation in Civil Litigation: A
Report on Practices and Procedures Prevailing in the United States (1961); Lenhoff,
Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical Analysis, 16 La. L.
Rev. 465 (1956); Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 619 (1955); Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in tha United
States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44 (1962).
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detrimental to United States interests. The commentators agree that, although
United States state and federal courts grant enforcement to qualifying money
judgments obtained abroad (whether by an American or a foreign plaintiff),
many civil law countries have been most reluctant to accord similar treatment
to judgments obtained in the United States.4 Such a situation poses serious
difficulties for a plaintiff in a United States action who seeks enforcement of
his judgment in the country where the defendant has assets. If the judgment
is not granted conclusive effect abroad, the plaintiff is faced with the prospect
of a reexamination of his case on the merits, involving loss of time, increased
expenses, and an uncertain outcome due to differences in substantive and
procedural law. Among civil law countries, differing national laws and a network
of bilateral conventions have tended to create an equally undesirable situation.
Measures taken within the United States have been to a great extent
aimed at procuring more favorable treatment of domestic. judgments abroad.
Although the success of these efforts is still undetermined, evaluations can be
made of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, now
adopted by two states,5 and the unprecedented participation by the United
States Government in international conferences for cooperation in private
international law.6 Although not directly connected with the enforceability of
judgments abroad, the long-arm and single-act statutes typified by the enact-
ments of New York and Illinois also bear on the problems under consideration5
In contrast to the outward-looking developments in the United States,
a proposed multilateral treaty under discussion in the Common Market
countries emphasizes relations among themselves. The proposal was drawn up
pursuant to the mandate of Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome, which exhorts
member states of the Community to negotiate with each other to insure for
the benefit of their nationals. Among the things they are to consider is "the
simplification of the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and execu-
tion of judicial decisions and arbitral awards."' A unification of the various
4. See generally Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 28-40; Nadelmann, Non-Recog-
nition of American Money-Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev.
236, 240-41 (1957).
S. 9B Uniform Laws Annotated [hereinafter cited U.LA.] (Supp. 1964, at 27). Illinois
and Maryland enacted the Uniform Act in 1963.
6. The United States Government was authorized by Congress to participate in the
Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International (Rome) Institute
for the Unification of Private Law by S. Res. 781, H. R. J. Res. 778, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963).
7. N.Y. CPLR § 302; MII. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1963). Similar statutes are
found in other states: see, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33411 (1960) ; Idaho Code Ann.
§ 5-514 (Supp. 1965); Wis. Stat. § 262 (Supp. 1966). See also the Uniform Interstate and
International Procedure Act, 9B U.LA. (Supp. 1964, at 74). See Smit, The Uniform Inter-
state and International Procedure Act Approved by the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws: A New Era Commences, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 415 (1962). See
also Ginsburg, The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Observations on
Current Views in the United States, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 89, 96-97 (1965). Fed. R. Civ. P.
4d (7) authorizes actions in which jurisdiction is based upon long-arm statutes to be brought
in the United States District Courts.
8. See the Preliminary Draft Convention Relating to the Jurisdiction of Courts; the
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national laws of the member states may ultimately prove a step toward unified
cooperation with nonmember states. Indeed, the Europeans have long partici-
pated in international conferences designed to achieve uniformity and coopera-
tion. Of more immediate interest is a 1964 decision of the French Cour de
Cassation by which that country extended conclusive effect to all foreign
money judgments, a move intended to obtain more favorable extraterritorial
treatment for French judgments.9
This article is primarily concerned with the trends respecting recognition
and enforcement of in personam money judgments. "Recognition" and "enforce-
ment" are terms sometimes used interchangeably. However, "recognition"
implies the standards to be applied in determining whether individual foreign
judgments are entitled to extraterritorial effect, while "enforcement" connotes
the methods by which this extraterritorial effect is to be given.10 There may be
"recognition" of a foreign judgment without "enforcement" of it, the latter
term referring to the granting of compulsory execution."
II. PoIicIEs UNDERLYING RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
While the importance of granting conclusive effect or compulsory execution
to foreign judgments is evidenced by the number of unilateral, bilateral and
multilateral efforts to assure it, these give little indication of the underlying
policies favoring such results. Res judicata is presently suggested as the proper
rationale in the United States.12 The current English rationale, that foreign
judgments create binding legal obligations, enforceable as any other debt,
has had some favor with American courts.' 3 On the other hand, the theory that
the judgment is prima facie evidence of the underlying claim no longer finds
acceptance.' 4 The notions of comity and reciprocity (especially popular with
some civil law countries) have been discussed in some opinions in the United
States.' 5 However, it would appear that res judicata, the doctrine that "seeks
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions in Civil and Commercial Matters, and the En-
forcement of Public Documents which has been submitted to the governments of the member
states of the European Economic Community. An English translation has been published in
2 CCH Common Market Rep. ff 6003.
9. See Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments: One Down
and More to Go, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 72 (1964).
10. Yntema, supra note 3, at 1132.
11. Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 222-23. Although outside the scope of this paper, it
should be noted that foreign judgments enjoy the effects of bar and collateral estoppel, be-
sides being capable of enforcement. Reese, supra note 2, at 788-89; see generally Smit, Res
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 UJ.C.LA.L. Rev. 44 (1962). For ajudicial discussion of collateral estoppel and res judicata with respect to foreign judgments,
see Bata v. Hill, 35 Del. Ch. 407, 139 A.2d 159 (1958), aff'd sub nor. Bata v. Bata, 39 Del.
Ch. 258, 163 A.2d 493 (Sup. Ct., 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961).
12. See Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32; Reese, supra note 2, at 784-89. See
Smit, supra note 3, for a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine as applied to foreign judg-
ments.
13. See Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32; Reese, supra note 3, at 784; Smit,
supra note 3, at 54; Yntema, supra note 3, at 1130-31, 1142-48.
14. The rule is apparently now defunct. Smit, supra note 3, at 49.
15. Reciprocity has been described as an expression of "the desire that judgments
rendered in this country should be held conclusive on the merits throughout the world,
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to prevent duplication of litigation that is unfair and harassing to individual
litigants"' 0 presents the best justificationY1 But it should not be supposed
that the doctrine should simply be transplanted from the domestic to the
international field. On the contrary, its limitations with respect to foreign
judgments have been recognized and analyzed.1 8
III. SOME GENERAL AsPECTS OF THE COMMON AND THE CIVIL LAW
Although there is general agreement on the end to be achieved, the
choice of a method seems to present some substantial problems. Because to a
large extent the recent developments perforce reflect the divergent and tradi-
tional attitudes of the common and the civil law, not only as to procedure and
jurisdiction generally, but also as to recognition and enforcement specifically,
a brief preliminary examination of but two of the many differences seems
appropriate: the approach of each system to legal problems in general; and
their concepts of jurisdiction and competence.
A. Sources and Attitudes
The hallmark of the common law is that it has been historically judge-made,
and in the United States the rules concerning the status of decisions rendered
coupled with the thought that the best way to attain this end is to grant the judgment
of a particular nation no more effect than the courts of that nation accord to one of
American origin." Reese, supra note 2, at 785. As to the undesirability of reciprocity, see
Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 619, 752
1955); Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical
Analysis, 16 La. L. Rev. 465 (1956); Smit, International Cooperation in Civil Litigation:
Some Observations on the Roles of International Law and Reciprocity, 9 Neth. Int'l L. Rev.,
137, 147-49 (English reprint 1962).
Comity, by contrast, has been said to be:
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its ter-
ritory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws ....
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). For criticisms of comity, see Smit & Miller,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 31-32; Reese, supra note 3, at 784 (stating that "Comity, a word
of loose and uncertain meaning at best, has little significance in this context other than as a
statement of the conflict of laws of the forum."); Yntema, supra note 3, at 1146. The
comity doctrine has met with little success in England. Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal
Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 619, 756-58 (1955).
16. Smt, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9
U.C.LJA.L. Rev. 44, 58 (1962).
17. See, e.g., Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32; Reese, supra note 3, at 784-85:
"This conclusion follows because the policy behind res judicata certainly applies to all judg-
ments, whether local or foreign; . . . and, quite simply, there is no other satisfactory ex-
planation for the fact that such judgments are usually enforced."
18. Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9
U.C.LAJL. Rev. 44, 61-75 (1962). A foreign judgment may have been rendered under a
system differing considerably in its laws of substance, procedure and evidence from those of
the second state, so that a second lawsuit would not be a mere duplication of the first. Id.
at 62. Since a variety of circumstances may render unfair the granting of binding effect to
a foreign judgment, the existing rules of disqualification-lack of judicial jurisdiction of the
first court, extrinsic fraud, violation of public policy or natural justice-should be main-
tained. Id. at 63-64.
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abroad have not been an exception.19 By contrast, the distinguishing char-
acteristic of a civil law system is its reliance upon codes and a resulting de-
emphasis on the role of the judiciary as a law-creating force.20 Although both
of these generalizations are properly subject to qualification, it is nevertheless
true that in the United States there is no federal statute dealing with the
status of foreign judgments, and among the states, only five have relevant
statutory enactments.2 1 On the other hand, in Western Europe the legislatures
play the leading role. With respect to recognition and enforcement, the pattern
has been restrictive internal legislation which has in many instances been
mitigated by conventions.2 2 Great Britain has, to some extent, adapted its
law to the Continental approach, having had since 1933 a Foreign Judgments
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act upon which six conventions have been based.28
This basic difference in approach has been one source of the reluctance
of the civil law countries to grant to American judgments conclusive effect,
especially in those nations requiring reciprocal treatment of their own judg-
ments.2 4 Such states, largely unfamiliar with the common law principle
of stare decisis, have disqualified American judgments on the ground that
United States courts do not accord conclusive effect to their own judgments.2 5
Reciprocity is an important concept on the Continent. It is said to have
originated as a retaliatory measure aimed at France and others who refused
conclusive effect to foreign judgments.20 It was not, however limited to
19. Smlt & Miller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 28-29. By contrast, legislation to facilitate
the recognition and enforcement of the judgments of sister states (which are encompassed
by the term "foreign judgments" in American law but not within the scope of this paper)
is typical. However, doctrines relating to extra-national judgments and sister state judgments
have mutually influenced each other. Yntema, supra note 3, at 1133-34.
20. See generally Schlesinger, Comparative Law 287-89 (2d ed. 1959).
21. Illinois and Maryland have enacted the Uniform Foreign Money-judgments Recog-
nition Act; 9B U.LA. (Supp. 1964, at 27). Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1915 provides that final
judgments of foreign courts having jurisdiction according to the laws of their countries "shall
have the same effect as in the country where rendered, and also the same effect as final
judgments rendered in this State." Montana and Oregon provide that foreign judgments
against a thing are conclusive, but as against a person, the judgment only creates a presump-
tion rebuttable by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 93-1001-27 (1947); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 43.190 (1953). But cf. supra note 14 and accompanying text, and Reese, supra
note 3, at 789 (generally foreign judgments "will not be denied effect merely because the
original court made an error either of fact or of law").
22. See Graupner, supra note 3, at 377-79. See generally Nadelmann, Non-Recognition
of American Money-Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236
(1957).
23. See Graupner, supra note 3, at 376; Graveson, The Tenth Session of the Hague
Conference of Private International Law, 14 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 528, 530 (1965); Note,
The Enforcement of Judgments: A Convention with Germany, 36 Brit. Yb. Intl L. 359
(1960).
24. Nadelmann, supra note 22, at 252.
25. Id. at 251-52, 253-54.
26. French courts, until 1964, had discretion to review the merits of foreign judgments,
a practice known as revision au fond. See Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign
Money-Judgments: One Down and More to Go, 13 Am. J. Intl L. 72 (1964). For a descrip.
tion of the practice, see Delaume, American-French Private International Law 161-65 (2d
ed. 1961).
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retaliatory use, but became a general rule, and even a statutory requirement.27
The creators of the codes, it has been observed, were "ready enough to confer
a wide jurisdiction on their own courts, but showed a deep mistrust of the
administration of justice in other countries." 28
Also responsible for the reciprocity imbroglio is the fact that under
common law there is no device (in the absence of statute) for summary enforce-
ment of foreign judgments similar to the exequatur proceeding familiar in
France and other civil law countries. 29 The reason given for the refusal of
enforcement to American judgments in such countries has been "that before
execution on foreign judgments can be had in [the United States,] a domestic
judgment must be obtained in a competent State court. By contrast, in those
countries, immediate execution on a foreign judgment, once the requirements
including that of reciprocity have been met, can be had as if it were a domestic
judgment."8 0
In Great Britain and the United States, on the other hand, whatever
may have been the historical antecedents to the current practice,3 1 the prevailing
rule (in the absence of a modifying or countervailing statute) is that reciprocity
is not a condition to the enforceability of foreign judgments. Great Britain at
present makes, by statute, reciprocal treatment as assured by treaty a "prereq-
uisite for the statute-created direct executability upon registration," but this
is not the case for "mere recognition." 32 With respect to reciprocity in the
United States, some states and the federal courts have flirted with the doctrine
at one time or another. The most noteworthy instance, and the most important
statement, of reciprocity as a requirement was the "magnificent dictum" of
Hilton v. Guyot 33 a Supreme Court case which denied enforcement to a
27. Nadelmann, supra note 22, at 249; Graupner, supra note 3, at 270-71. For a discus-
sion of the sources of and reasons for reciprocity in Europe with particular emphasis on
foreign judgments and international judicial assistance, see Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the.
Law of Foreign Judgments: A Histor cal-Critical Analysis, 16 La. L. Rev. 465 (1956).
28. Graupner, supra note 3, at 368.
29. Nadelmann, supra note 22, at 259. Exequatur in French law is a writ which, when
issued in respect of a foreign judgment, renders the judgment executory-i.e., subject to exe-
cution in the same manner as a judgment of a French court. The proceeding is instituted in a
civil tribunal where the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, jurisdiction; correct procedure; and
proper application of foreign law. He must prove the judgment by producing the original
copy authenticated by the foreign judge and recording officer whose signatures are verified
by the proper French officials. Judgments not in French are accompanied by a translation
under oath. The defendant may deny plaintiff's allegation or plead affirmatively, and the pro-
ceeding goes forward much like an ordinary action. Katz & Brewster, Cases in International
Transactions and Relations 442 (1960). Under French law, the exequatur is not considered as
a new judgment, but merely as a recognition of the validity of the original judgment.
Delaume, op. cit. supra note 26, at 160.
30. Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 619,
763 (1955).
31. For a discussion of reciprocity in Anglo-American law, see id. at 752-65.
32. Id. at 758.
33. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). The opinion was referred to as a "magnificent dictum" by
Judge Pound in Johnston v. Compagnie Gn6rale Transatiantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 388, 152
N.E. 121, 123 (1926), the decision which started a movement among the state courts, away
from reciprocity. Hilton v. Guyot was an appeal from a lower federal court and the
Supreme Court did not purport to lay down a rule of law binding on state courts. Reese,
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French judgment because France did not give conclusive effect to American
judgments. Hilton v. Guyot, insofar as it concerned comity and reciprocity, did
not attain a wide following among state courts, and its binding force for federal
courts has probably been laid to rest by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,3 4
requiring federal courts (in diversity cases) to apply the conflicts rule operative
in the states in which they sit.35
Reciprocity is considered by American commentators3" and by some Euro-
pean jurists37 as patently undesirable. Its postulates have been exposed as false:
the first premise, the belief that the interests of non-resident nationals
would be advanced by the recognition of judgments rendered in their father-
land, was erroneous because it confused a national judgment with a judgment
for a national; while the second premise, the principle of equality among states
with its claims for equal treatment in the name of national dignity, wrongly
assumes that states should not differ on questions of policy.38 Among the
reasons urged for the elimination of reciprocity are the injustice of holding the
individual foreign litigant responsible for the policies of his country and the
fact that the doctrine has failed to insure desired laws in other countries.8"
supra note 3, at 790. The case in any event placed a number of limitations on the reciprocity
requirement. The Court stated that foreign in rem, quasi in rem and status judgments
should ordinarily be granted conclusive effect, and an in personam judgment should be re-
garded as conclusive-not merely prima fade evidence of the underlying claim-if the person
invoking the foreign claim was the defendant in the first proceeding. For discussions of
Hilton, see Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev.
619, 760-63 (1955); Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-
Critical Analysis, 16 La. L. Rev. 465, 471-74 (1956); Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 235;
Reese, supra at 790-93. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 165 (rev. ed. 1962) lists states that
have rejected and states that still accept the Hilton rule of reciprocity.
34. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
35. Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 29; Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of Ameri-
can Money-Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 241 (1957).
36. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 392-93 (4th ed. 1964); Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The
Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 619 (1955); Lenhoff, Reciprocity and
the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical Analysis, 16 La. L. Rev. 465 (1956);
Nadelmann, supra note 35, at 249-54; Reese, supra note 3, at 790-93; Smit, International Res
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 44, 49-50 (1962).
Cf. Reese, supra note 3, at 793, suggesting that reciprocity might provide a useful bargaining
weapon for the United States Government in negotiating treaties; Lenhoff, Reciprocity and
the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical Analysis, 16 La. L. Rev. 465, 469
(1956), suggesting that reclprocity might be useful in the area of international judicial assist-
ance, but not in recognition and enforcement.
37. See Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments: One Down
and More to Go, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 72, 74 (1964).
38. Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perenial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 619,
764 (1955). See also Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-
Critical Analysis, 16 La. L. Rev. 465, 473 (1956), noting that if reciprocity were intended
to further the interests of nationals, Germany, e.g., would always enforce an American
judgment in favor of a German, but, in fact, it denies enforcement regardless of the na-
tionality of the party seeking it.
39. Reese, supra note 3, at 793 (also suggesting that the requirement places a burden
on the courts which must determine whether the country of the judgment in issue grants
conclusive effect to the enforcing state's judgments); Smit, International Cooperation in
Civil Litigation: Some Observations on the Roles of International Law and Reciprocity, 9
Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 137, 147-48 (English reprint 1962). But see Nadelmann, supra note 37,
at 78 (noting tht effect of the German requirement of reciprocity on the French court's
decision to grant conclusive effect to foreign judgments).
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As a precondition to enforcement, reciprocity tends to restrict liberal develop-
ments by encouraging retaliation instead of liberalization of enforcement.
Even where this is not the case, compliance with the requirement of reciprocity
is often difficult because of the differences in national laws.40
B. Jurisdiction and Competence
Whether a judgment will be enforced by a second state depends everywhere
upon whether or not the court of the second state deems the court of the first
state to have been competent to render the judgment (assuming, of course, that
reciprocity is not a bar). This decision is generally reached on the basis of
enforcing state's own rules with respect to competence and jurisdiction. 4 '
A comparison of the common and civil law rules is complicated somewhat by the
differing conceptual implications of jurisdictional terms in the two systems. For
example, in civil law, authority to adjudicate a matter is regarded as preexisting
the bringing of a suit, whereas in the common law, the traditional rule is that
the power commences with service of process.4 2
Moreover, jurisdiction and competence tend to be confused, although they
represent different aspects of the power of a political body to render a judicial
judgment.48 "Jurisdiction," in Anglo-American terminology, has several mean-
ings, but for purposes of comparative law it has been suggested that it should be
used "only to describe the power of a political body, as determined by its own
higher (constitutional) law, the law of a superior political body, or the law of a
foreign state (indirect jurisdiction), to refer a given controversy to its courts.",44
"Competence," a term not in general usage in the United States,45 should
describe the power that the political body has in fact permitted its courts to
exercise.4 0 In the United States and other federal systems, reference must be
had to both jurisdiction and competence, but within his own system a Continental
jurist normally "need not look beyond the rules of competence indicating whether
and which domestic courts have been authorized by the legislature to deal with
the case."1
4 7
Indirect jurisdiction or competence gdndrale indirecte-describing the power
of a political body by the law of a foreign state-is a term subject to still further
confusion. Frequently used in connection with the recognition of foreign judg-
ments, it is often considered synonymous with "jurisdiction in the international
40. Smit, supra note 39, at 148.
41. Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221, 223
(1941).
42. Ginsburg, The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Observations
on Current Views in the United States, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 89, 90 (1965).
43. See id. at 91-92; see generally Stnit, The Terms Jurisdiction and Competence in
Comparative Law, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 164 (1961), on the undesirability of the unselective
use of the term "jurisdiction" to denote the various forms of judicial jurisdiction and com-
petence in comparative law.
44. Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 92.
45. Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 221.
46. Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 92.
47. Ibid. See also Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 221.
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sense." 48 Indirect jurisdiction denotes "judicial authority as determined under
the law of the state in which application is made for the enforcement of a
judgment rather than for initial adjudication of a claim."40 Jurisdiction in the
international sense properly applies to competence in cases with international
aspects. 0
Under the common law, the traditional basis for a court's exercise of judicial
authority (competence) in in personam actions has been the presence of the
defendant within the territorial ambit of the court,"' together with personal
service of process upon him, often called the "transient rule."52 Such a notion is
totally foreign to Continental jurists, who regard it on a par with such exorbitant
bases for in personam judgments as Article 14 of the French Code Civil and
Article 23 of the German Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure).53 Judg-
ments based solely on an exorbitant rule are generally not recognized, nor are
they expected to be.54
The exorbitant bases on the Continent vary from country to country;
by contrast, the basic general rules exhibit some similarity and can be generalized
as follows. The plaintiff must bring his suit in the court of the defendant's
domicile in matters involving persons and movables (actor sequituir foru m rei),15
or in the court of the place where an obligation arose or where it has been
48. For discussions of these terms, see Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 92-93; Graupner,
Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Western
Europe, 12 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 367, 372-74 (1963); Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 225; Smit,
supra note 43, at 166.
49. Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 93 n.18.
50. Ibid. Public international law has not developed rules for delimitation of judicialjurisdiction among nations. The term "jurisdiction in the international sense" or "interna-
tional jurisdiction" refers merely to jurisdiction with international elements, not to the
source of the jurisdiction exercised. Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International
Jurisdiction, 50 Cornell L.Q. 5 (1964).
51. In this context, "jurisdiction" refers to the "territorial area . . . within which a
given power may be exercised." Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 91.
52. For discussions of the transient rule, see Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 103-07 (rev.
ed. 1962); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 115-17 (4th ed. 1964); Ehrenzweig, The Transient
Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale LJ. 289
(1956).
53. Article 14 of the French Code Civil and the similar Article 14 of the Luxembourg
Code Civil allow a French or Luxembourg national to sue in his national courts a foreigner
on "the sole ground that he is a foreigner, and this even when the litigation has no connec-
tion with the country where the proceedings take place." Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdic-
tion in the Common Market Countries, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 323, 324 (1961). Article 23 of
the German Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure) allows a suit in German courts
against any defendant who has assets in Germany, provided he is neither domiciled nor resi-
dent there. Id. at 327. For a description of other exorbitant bases, see infra, note 182.
54. Nadebmann, Non-Recognition of American Money-Judgments Abroad and What
to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 261 (1957). It has been pointed out that if the
United States were to enter a treaty on the recognition and enforcement of judgments, It is
highly probable that the transient rule would be excluded as an acceptable basis of juris-
diction. Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, g0 Cornell L.Q.
5, 8 (1964).
55. Weser, supra note 53, at 328. The rule is not uniform among the Common Market
countries, however. If a defendant has no domicile in the country, suit may be brought at
his residence, but France and Germany allow this alternative basis only where the defendant
has no domicile in any country. With respect to corporations, suit may be brought at the
siege social; the definition of the siege varies. Id. at 329-30.
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or must be performed (forum contractus)." Attitudes toward forum contractus
differ among the Common Market countries to a somewhat greater extent than
actor sequitur forum rei; in the Netherlands, for example, it does not obtain at
all.57 If the cause is in tort, besides the defendant's domicile suit may be brought
in the court of the place where the act occurred, although the rationale for the
rule varies and the rule itself is not always explicit.58 It can be seen that, with
the exception of the exorbitant rules, Continental procedure59 is concerned pri-
marily with some nexus between the forum and the act sued upon, or with the
defendant. Such a nexus is regarded as missing from the transient rule of Anglo-
American law, at least where there is no other connection between the defendant,
the cause of action and the forum state.
However, there are other bases for the exercise of jurisdiction in the common
law which more closely resemble the European non-exorbitant rules-a fact
which has significance for the recognition and enforcement of United States
judgments abroad because of the application of indirect jurisdiction. Among
those recognized by both systems are: consent; domicile; citizenship; owner-
ship of property within the state, where the cause of action arises from and is
reasonably related to the defendant's ownership of the property; and certain
activities within the state with regard to causes arising out of such activities.60
This last basis is in abrogation of the traditional common law rule which does
not recognize contract, tort or economic activity as jurisdiction-conferring acts.61
Statutes in several of the states in the United States have expanded the reach
of their courts which may thus obtain in personam jurisdiction over persons
outside the state, provided always that the requirements of due process have
been met.
6 2
56. Id. at 331.
57. Belgium, Germany and Italy recognize it in all types of cases, but in Germany suit
can be brought only at the place of performance; Belgium and Italy provide a choice be-
tween place of contract and place of performance. France and Luxembourg recognize forum
contractus only in commercial cases. Ibid.
58. Only France and Germany have a specific provision. Id. at 332. Other fundamental
bases of jurisdiction are described id. at 333-36.
59. Besides the exorbitant and fundamental bases, special rules govern, e.g., patents and
trademarks. Id. at 337-38.
60. Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 94-95, also noting the similarity of these bases to those
listed in a prior draft Hague Conference Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments, the draft convention of the Common Market states, and the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. The International Law Association has ap-
proved a Model Act Respecting the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judg-
ments which contains a non-exclusive catalogue of similar bases but does not mention
ownership of property. International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-First (Tokyo)
Conference xvii, xix-xx (1964).
61. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 52, at 124.
62. See supra note 7 for citations to representative state statutes. On the requirements
of due process, see, e.g., Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today
and Tomorrow, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 61 (1965) (the test is whether the contacts with the
forum are such as make it reasonable to require the defendant to defend) ; Reese & Galston,
Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev.
249-58 (1959) (reviewing US. Supreme Court cases).
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IV. THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Because the common law generally accords conclusive effect to final foreign
judgments, the developments under discussion will have little actual effect on
the treatment of such judgments in the United States except to the extent that
they affect methods of enforcement. In order to assess these measures, it seems
appropriate to begin with a discussion of the common law rules prevailing in most
states.
A. Indirect Jurisdiction
Although final foreign judgments are usually granted conclusive effect with-
out a review of the merits, no such certainty exists as that which surrounds the
judgments of sister states.6 3 But like the judgments of sister states, a foreign
judgment will not be granted more extensive effect than it enjoys in the place
of rendition. If lack of competence of the rendering court makzes the judgment
unenforceable in the first state, it will not be recognized in the United States. 4
The ultimate reference, however, is not to foreign law but to American concepts.
United States due process standards apparently affect the determination of
whether the jurisdictional nexus and the method of notification were sufficient
to justify recognition of the adjudication abroad.6 5 A corollary of indirect juris-
diction is that "the findings of the foreign court in respect to jurisdiction are
not binding upon the forum." 60 And testing the jurisdiction of the first court
according to the forum's own conceptions 7 may result in a denial of recogni-
tion even though in the same circumstances the forum court would have had
jurisdiction.68
Whether the foreign court had jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
63. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L.
Rev. 783 (1950). That foreign judgments are generally granted conclusive effect, see generally
Smit & Miller, International Cooperation in Civil Litigation: A Report on Practices and
Procedures Prevailing in the United States 28-40 (1961); Nadehmann, Non-Recognition of
American Money-Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 240-41(1957).
64. Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 39; Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 231-34.
65. Reese, supra note 63, at 789-90 (stating that the same standards are apparently
applied in determining jurisdiction or adequacy of notice as are applicable to domesticjudgments, although if questioned, the foreign judgment may be subject to closer scrutiny).
But see Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 36-37 (noting the influence of the law
concerning sister state judgments on foreign judgments, and the fact that different con-
siderations are relevant, which has led some courts to deny recognition to foreign judgments
although the first court had, under traditional rules, jurisdiction). Cf. Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 1915. However, the California courts have applied American standards of jurisdiction.
Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 29 n.104.
66. Nussbaun, supra note 41, at 224.
67. Id. at 222.
68. Id. at 223. Thus, an English court has held that a French judgment against a
non-resident obtained after extraterritorial service on the defendant, valid under French
law, is not recognizable even though English law gave English courts jurisdiction over non-
residents under substantially the same theory. The court noted that a United States court
would not recognize such an English judgment. Id. at 223-24. See also Castel, Jurisdiction
and Money-Judgments Rendered Abroad: Anglo-American and French Practice Compared,
4 McGill LJ. 152, 174-79 (1958).
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is perhaps the most important-and the most troublesome--question. 69 Judg-
ments grounded on exorbitant bases are not recognized and therefore cannot
be enforced in the United States.70 But even if the basis is not exorbitant, if it
is one not recognized in the United States recognition may be denied 71 because
the American court tests, in its own terms, whether or not res judicata effect
will be given to the judgment beyond the borders of the jurisdiction of its origin.72
At present, bases acceptable in the United States for the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction by a foreign court include: the defendant's domicile or nationality
in the foreign state at the commencement of the action; consent; doing business
in the foreign state; doing an act in the foreign state out of which the cause
arose; and the ownership of property within the foreign state with respect to
causes of action against the owner.73 The evolution of these bases in the United
States, brought about in part through long-arm legislation, has resulted in the
enforceability of judgments previously not recognized. Two New York cases
illustrate this development.
Ross v. Ostrander74 involved an American defendant who had resided in
England for several years. During the course of his residence there, he entered
into a seven-year lease but left England before the term was up. An action was
brought in England for arrears in rent, the defendant having been personally
served in New York pursuant to Order XI of the Rules of the High Court, which
provides for service outside the jurisdiction against a nonresident in a suit
respecting the breach of a contract which was made in England. In an action
brought to have the English default judgment enforced in New York, the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that the
New York requirements of jurisdiction were not met. The court noted, inter
alia, that the judgment would not have been valid if obtained in a sister state,
citing Pennoyer v. Neff.7 5
The second case, Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp.,76 enforced an
English default judgment similarly based on Order XI. The New York court
declined to follow Ross, noting that Pennoyer was "practically overruled" by
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 7 7 and that New York's new long-arm
69. As to the difficulties presented by jurisdictional requirements in efforts to secure
reciprocal enforcement of foreign judgments, see Nadelmann, supra note 63, at 261-62.
70. Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 226.
71. See generally Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 33-37.
72. Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 225.
73. Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 34; Nadelmann, supra note 63, at 261-62.
See the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 5(a) (1) providing that a
foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition if the defendant was served personally
within the state. 9B U.LA. (Supp. 1964, at 27).
74. 192 Misc. 140, 79 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
75. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). The Supreme Court stated that service of process within the
state was essential for a valid personal judgment. 95 U.S. at 727 (dictum).
76. 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966).
77. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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statute78 permitted New York courts to acquire in personam jurisdiction in a
manner similar to that provided under Order XIY9
Competence of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter of the
action does not appear to fall within the scope or the purpose of indirect juris-
diction. Indeed, it is generally presumed that a foreign court of record is a court
of "general jurisdiction" although proof to the contrary may be offered.80
If the enforcing court decides that the foreign court was not competent to act
with respect to the matter in litigation, however, the judgment will be neither
recognized nor enforced.8 1 This was one of the issues in the incredibly long and
complicated Bata litigation.8 2 In the New York proceedings in that case, and
in one of the Delaware proceedings, a decision of the District Court at Zlin,
Czechoslovakia, was denied res judicata effect because, inter alia, the subject
matter of the litigation exceeded the amount of money as to which the court
was competent under Czechoslovakian law, which the New York court examined
at length.83
B. Defenses to Recognition or Enforcement
Even if the foreign judgment meets the tests of indirect jurisdiction and is
enforceable in the first state, it may still be denied conclusive effect on the
ground of extrinsic fraud,84 violation of natural justice,8 r or violation of the
public policy of the second state.86 Extrinsic fraud deprives the aggrieved party
of an adequate opportunity to present his case to the court.87 The grounds for
finding violations of natural justice or the public policy of the forum are less
78. N.Y. CPLR § 302.
79. Under § 313 of the CPLR a defendant may be served without the state and made
subject to the jurisdiction of the state on the basis of an act committed there as enumerated
ing § 302. At the time of the Plugmay decision, jurisdiction could be based on the com-
mission of a tortious act within the state; the owning, use or possession of any real
property within the state; the transaction of any business within the state. The section was
later amended to provide that the commission of tortious acts without the state which
cause injury within the state is, under certain circumstances, a basis for personal jurisdiction.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 590.
There is some rather confusing language in Plugmay which seems to indicate that the
question of the English court's jurisdiction over the defendant involved the public policy
of New York. See 48 Misc. 2d at 916, 917, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 244-45. The Common Market
Preliminary Draft Convention provides that the question of jurisdiction is not one of
public policy, which seems to be the proper view; 2 CCH Common Market Rep. lJ 6003,
6032. See infra, text at notes 91-93.
80. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 52, at 396. See also Nussbaum, supra note 41, at
231-34.
81. Ibid. See also Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, 33-34, 37.
82. The litigation involved cases in Czechosolovakia (in 1933), Holland, Switzerland,
Delaware and New York. See Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. Ch. 548, 555, 170 A,2d 711, 715 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
83. Id. at 556-57, 170 A.2d at 717; Bata v. Chase Safe Deposit Co., 99 N.Y.S.2d
535, 571-75 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd sub. nom. Bata v. Bata, 279 App. Div. 182, 108 N.Y.S.2d
659 (lst Dep't 1951), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 96, 115 N.E.2d 672, 108 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1953).
84. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 52, at 397-98; Reese, supra note 63, at 793-94.
85. Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 33; Reese, supra note 63, at 795-96.
86. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 202-05 (rev. ed. 1962); Goodrich, op. cit. supra note
52, at 398-400; Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 33; Reese, supra note 63, at 796-98.
87. Reese, supra note 63, at 784. Intrinsic fraud, by contrast, involves matters passed
upon by the first court. Ibid.
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dear. It appears that natural justice is denied if the proceedings departed rather
flagrantly from generally accepted notions of fairness,88 but that only an extreme
deviation warrants denial of recognition; a marked difference in procedure is
not enough,8 9 and a strict application of domestic due process standards is un-
called for.90 Public policy, on the other hand, is said to be offended if the subject
matter of the judgment arouses local opposition to enforcement.9 However, the
Ccopposition policy should need to be particularly violent to overcome enforce-
ment. There is a wider public policy in favor of recognition .... 92 Within this
limitation, the defense may be directed at the nature of the cause of action
underlying the judgment, or it may be based upon a domestic policy requiring
reexamination of the merits in order to protect the citizens or institutions of the
second state.93
Underlying these defenses are certain attitudes regarding private rights as
opposed to public relations.94 It will be recalled that the arguments against
reciprocity are in part founded on the desire to deal justly with individual liti-
gants who should not be punished for the inadequate recognition rules of their
countries. Similarly, the defenses of fraud and violation of natural justice are
designed to protect the litigants. On the other hand, the public policy exception
is designed to safeguard the citizens or institutions of the second state.9 5
With respect to these defenses, a court in the United States is not unlikely
to depart from the standards of full faith and credit as applied to sister state
judgments. 6 Thus, when a foreign judgment is at issue, the question of fraud
will probably be decided under the law of the second state rather than the
first9 7 because "it seems unlikely that an American court would permit the issue
of fraud to be settled conclusively by a foreign law which might be based upon
conceptions of fairness and justice at substantial variance with those prevailing
in this country."98 Moreover, the defense of public policy is unavailable with
respect to sister state judgments.99
88. Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 33; Reese, supra note 63, at 795-96.
89. Reese, supra note 63, at 796.
90. Ibid.
91. Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 33; Reese, supra note 63, at 796-98.
92. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 52, at 399.
93. Reese, supra note 63, at 797-98.
94. Judge Pound, in refusing to follow Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), said in
part: ".... the question is one of private rather than public international law, of private
right rather than public relations, and our courts will recognize private rights acquired
under foreign laws and the sufficiency of evidence establishing such rights." Johnston v.
Compagnie Gfnfrale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 387, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926). See also
Reese, supra note 63, at 785.
95. Reese, supra note 63, at 796-98. American and English courts do not make a
practice of discriminating in favor of their nationals, but they might question a judgment
where there is substantial reason to believe they may have been seriously prejudiced at the
hands of the foreign court. Id. at 785.
96. That despite the influence the law concerning sister states has had on foreignjudgments, different considerations do and should prevail, see Smit, International Res Judi-
cata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L A,. Rev. 44, 45-46 (1962).
97. Reese, supra note 63, at 794.
98. Ibid. Other aspects of the defense, however, resemble the treatment given to
97
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Other defenses may be briefly noted. The general rule with respect to judg-
ments based upon penal and fiscal claims is that they are not enforceable.
Payment or other discharge of the obligation created by the judgment prevents
enforcement, as does a showing that the foreign judgment was not on the
merits. Judgments that are not final where rendered are not enforceable, but
the fact that an appeal is pending does not preclude the granting of conclusive
effect unless the effect of appeal in the rendering state is to vacate or suspend
judgment. Finally, it should be noted that error of fact or law by the first
court is no defense.'0 0
C. Consequences of Recognition
The effect of recognition of a foreign judgment is not, under the common
law, immediate execution in its character as a judgment.' 0 ' As to foreign
judgments, there is no "merger" of the original claim in the judgment. 0 2 Thus,
unless provision for enforcement is made by statute, the plaintiff must bring
a new action on the foreign judgment; for the obligation which it is deemed to
impose must be reduced to a judgment in the forum by a new action in order to
be executed. 103 It is said that this particular treatment of foreign judgments
under the common law is an attempt to reconcile the principle of territorial
jurisdiction of courts-which demands that the enforcement of a judgment out-
side the territory of the rendering court must be placed upon some other basis
than the authority of the rendering court which ceased at its jurisdictional
limits-and the principle of res judicata.10 4
The practical effect of the non-merger rule is that the plaintiff seeking to
enforce the judgments may sue either on the judgment itself or on the original
claim. The option is of scant importance as between the parties to the suit:
even if the suit is on the original claim, the foreign judgment is normally con-
clusive upon the issues involved.105 As to civil law countries, however, almost
sister-state judgments. It has been held, for example, that if the foreign court actually
passed on the question of fraud, that issue will not be reexamined on the merits. Ibid.
99. Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 86, at 203; Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 52, at
400.
100. As to penal and fiscal claims, see Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 86, at 205; Good-
rich, op. cit. supra note 52, at 402-03; cf. Reese, supra note 63, at 797. As to payment or
other discharge, see Reese, supra note 63, at 798-99. As to the foreign judgment not being
on the merits, see Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 52, at 405-06. As to the finality of foreign
judgments, see Note, The Finality of Judgments in the Conflict of Laws, 41 Colum. L. Rev.
878 (1941); see also Abmatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup.
Ct. 1952) (also dealing with two conflicting judgments from two foreign countries, and
holding that the one later in time prevails) ; Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 86, at 221-22;
But see Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. Ch. 258, 163 A.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
964 (1961). As to error of fact or law, see Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 52, at 404.
101. Smit & Miller, op. cit. supra note 63, at 38; Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1135-42 (1935).
102. This is in contrast to judgments of sister states entitled to full faith and credit.
Yntema, supra note 101, at 1136, 1139-40.
103. Id. at 1144.
104. Ibid. With respect to the enforcement of sister state judgments, see id. at 1148-50.
105. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L.
Rev. 783, 788 (1950).
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all of which provide by statute for a summary proceeding for enforcement, the
common law enforcement practice is a source of much complaint.10 6
D. Recent Developments
The adoption of recent measures relevant to the enforcement of foreign
judgments generally indicate that the United States has found internal develop-
ment inadequate, not because justice has been denied to those seeking to have
their foreign judgments enforced here, but because United States judgments
have been accorded less than favorable treatment abroad. Since United States
citizens tend to be creditors, action to rectify the prevailing situation has been
deemed unlikely to originate abroad.10 7
The measures taken have been both unilateral and internal, and multilateral
and external. On the internal side, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act codifies the common law rules on recognition in the hope that
American law on the subject will thus be more comprehensible-and perhaps
more readily available-to the civil law courts. 08 The external developments
have been the recent congressional authorizations for the participation by
the United States in The Hague Conference on Private International Law and
the International (Rome) Institute for the Unification of Private Law. 0 9
Hitherto, the United States had remained aloof from such multilateral efforts, an
attitude which may have been detrimental to its own interests."10
Finally, the relevance of long-arm statutes should be noted. These enact-
ments affect both the enforceability of foreign judgments in this country and
the treatment accorded United States judgments abroad. The first aspect has
already been briefly touched upon. The major portion of the second aspect is
deferred to the section on enforceability in the Common Market countries.
1. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act is in large part
intended to attain for United States judgments general recognition and enforce-
ment abroad. Especially in those states conditioning conclusive effect upon re-
ciprocity, judgments of American origin have been denied recognition either
106. Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev.
619, 763 (1955); Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money-Judgments Abroad and
What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 259 (1957).
107. Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U. Rev.
619, 763 (1955).
108. See Nadelmann, supra note 106, at 252.
109. S.Res. 781, H.RJ. Res. 778, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Steps toward interna-
tional cooperation have been taken on other fronts as well, and all should go far in creating
a proper climate for improved relations generally in private international law. See, e.g., the
new law to improve judicial procedures for serving documents, obtaining evidence and
proving documents in litigation with international aspects, 78 Stat. 995 (1964) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.), discussed in detail in Smit, International
Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1015 (1965).
110. Nadelmann, supra note 106, at 257. Since 1874 the United States had often been
invited to participate in such efforts but declined on the ground that its federal system raised
great difficulties in carrying such projects into effect. Ibid.
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because the foreign court was not satisfied that local judgments would be
recognized in the American jurisdiction involved, or because no certification of
the existence of reciprocity could be obtained.' Codification, it was thought,
would render it more likely that such countries could satisfy themselves that
their judgments are enforceable in the United States.
The act purports to codify, but not to limit, the case law on recognition. It
provides that a judgment rendered abroad which qualifies for recognition is to
be treated in the same manner as a judgment of a sister state entitled to full
faith and credit.112 The recognition act provides for summary denial of recogni-
tion in only three situations: when the court of rendition is a part of a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or a procedure compatible with the
requirements of due process; when the court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the defendant; and when subject matter jurisdiction was absent. The subject
matter jurisdiction requirement is not more particularly stated, but section 5 of
the act sets forth, without limiting, acceptable bases of personal jurisdiction.
Section 5 provides that recognition shall not be refused for lack of personal
jurisdiction if: the defendant was served personally within the foreign state or
voluntarily appeared (other than for limited purposes); or if the defendant
consented to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject
matter involved; or if he was a domiciliary of the foreign state at the time of
institution of the action; or if he had a business office in the state and the pro-
ceedings involved a claim arising out of business done through that office; or if
he operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state out of which the
action arose. The bases listed are more particularly defined than those in the
typical long-arm statutes,"13 but the recognition act specifically provides that
the courts of the enacting state may recognize other bases of jurisdiction.
Permissive grounds for denying recognition are: lack of notice to the
defendant in time for him to defend; fraud; repugnance of the claim to the
public policy of the second state; conflict with another final and conclusive
judgment; violation of an agreement between the parties under which the dispute
was to be settled other than by the court of rendition; and, in the case of
jurisdiction based solely on personal service, serious inconvenience of the forum
for the trial of the action." 4 Finally, if the defendant shows that an appeal is
pending or intended, the second court may stay recognition proceedings."1
111. Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recog-
nition Act, 9B U.L.A. (Supp. 1964, at 27). In some countries the government advises the
courts whether reciprocity exists; in others, the courts themselves make this determination.
Nadelmann, supra note 106, at 249-54.
112. 9B U.LA. (Supp. 1964, at 27, 28). For a discussion of the powers of Congress
with respect to the enforcement of sister state judgments, see Yntema, supra note 101, at
1148-50.
113. Commissioners' Note to § 3, 9B UL.A. (Supp. 1964, at 27, 28). The Uniform En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments Act is found at 9A UL.A. 475. For a discussion of the
enforcement of sister state judgments, with comments on the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act, see Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42
Iowa L. Rev. 202 (1957).
114. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Rev. 1964), 9A ULA. 486.
100
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The Commissioners anticipate that the method of enforcement will be that
provided in the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act116 in a state
having enacted that Act, but this is not specifically stated in the text. Nor does
their comment mention the 1964 Revision of the Enforcement Act, and it is not
clear whether under the terms of the Revision it is available to extra-national
judgments." 7 Indeed, the lack of textual reference to either enforcement act
may mitigate the salutory effect abroad that the recognition act is hoped to have.
However, it should go a long way toward clarifying recognition law in the
United States.
2. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1948, adopted by
eight states, provides for a summary judgment procedure for judgments of sister
states or federal courts. After registration of the judgment in accordance with
the act, the petitioner is entitled to have service of process upon the judgment
debtor as in an action brought upon the foreign judgment; if in personam juris-
diction cannot be obtained, provision is made for quasi in rem jurisdiction. If,
after in personam jurisdiction is acquired, the judgment debtor fails to plead,
the registered judgment becomes a final personal judgment of the court in which
it is registered. If quasi in rem jurisdiction is obtained and the judgment debtor
has not acted to set aside the registration, the registered judgment becomes a
final judgment quasi in rem of the court-in which it is registered. If the judg-
ment debtor asserts any defense permissible under the law of the registering
state, the issues raised are to be tried and determined as in local civil actions.
The 1948 Act was revised in 1964, but thus far, no states have adopted the
Revision." 8 In their prefatory note to the 1964 Revision, the Commissioners
note that although the 1948 Act was a distinct improvement over the prior
procedure, it fell short of the method provided by Congress for the inter-district
enforcement of judgments of the federal district courts," 9 the practice of which
is adopted by the Revision. The foreign judgment, properly authenticated under
federal or state law, may be filed in the office of the clerk of a specified state
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1964). See Note, Registration of Federal Judgments, 42 Iowa
L. Rev. 285 (1957).
116. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Rev. 1964) § 2.
117. The Model Act provides for a stay in enforcement proceedings under these condi-
tions, International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-First (Tokyo) Conference xxiii, as
do the 1948 Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act § 9 and the 1964 Revision § 4.
118. The definition of scope varies, § 1 of the 1948 Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act applying to "any judgment ...of a court of the United States 'or of any
State or Territory which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state." By contrast, § 1
of the 1964 version reads ". . . any judgment . . . of a court of the United States or of
any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state."
The Model Act Respecting the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money-
Judgments of the International Law Association provides for registration or exequatur in
accordance with the procedure of the enacting state, rather than a summary judgment
procedure. International Law Association, supra note 117, at xvii, xxi-xxiii.
119. For example, the Illinois and New York long-arm statutes provide generally for
the commission of a tortious act within the state. N.Y. CPLR § 302(a) (2); IM. Rev. Stat.
ch. 110, § 17(1)(b) (1963).
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court, who is to treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as domestic
judgments. A judgment so filed is to have the same effect and is subject to the
same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying
as a judgment of the court in which it is filed, and may be enforced or satisfied
in like manner.120 The clerk is to notify the judgment debtor of the fact of filing
and the debtor may show, in addition to the defenses permissible under the
law of the state, that an appeal is pending or to be taken, or that a stay has
been granted. Enforcement in the second state, in that event, is stayed upon
proof that the debtor has furnished security for satisfaction of the judgment as
required by the first state. The debtor may also show grounds upon which
enforcement of a judgment of the state of filing would be stayed.
Neither version affects the right of the judgment creditor to have his
judgment enforced by an action thereon.
Only Illinois has enacted both the 1948 Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act and the recognition act. As to states which adopt the recogni-
tion act but which have not also adopted one of the enforcement acts, and which
have no other statute providing for the enforcement of foreign judgments, it
may be questionable whether their own judgments will be viewed in a more
favorable light than is currently said to shine abroad.' 2 '
3. The British Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act
In connection with the United States Uniform Acts, a summary of the
British Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933,122 may be
120. With respect to the doctrine of forum non conveniens in an era of expanded
bases of personal jurisdiction, see Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 86, at 122-23; Ginsburg,
The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Observations on Current Views
in the United States, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 89, 98-100 (1965).
Recognition under the International Law Association Model Act is subject to some-
what more particularized conditions than under the Uniform Act. The first court must have
had jurisdiction, which may have been based upon: (i) voluntary, and not limited, appear-
ance by the judgment debtor in the first proceeding; (ii) the judgment debtor expressly
agreeing to the first court's jurisdiction; (iii) his ordinarily residing in the first state or
being plaintiff or counterclaimant in the first action; (iv) if a corporation, its having its
seat or principal place of business in the first state; (v) or the judgment debtor maintaining
a commercial establishment or branch in the first state with respect to which the cause
arose. If the action was in contract and the parties had different residences, the first court
had jurisdiction if the contract was to be performed in that place; in tort, if the act which
caused the injury or the last event necessary to render the defendant liable occurred there.
This last provision apparently goes beyond even the recent amendment to the New York
long-arm statute, which provides for personal jurisdiction for tortious acts committed with-
out the state causing injury within the state, under certain circumstances. See infra note
165; see also Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction over Foreign Torts: The 1966
Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, supra p. 67.
Recognition is to be denied if a default judgment was rendered without sufficient notice
to the defendant; if natural justice (due process) was violated; if the strong public policy
of the second state would be violated; if a res judicata judgment in the matter exists in the
second state; or if the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud. International Law Asso-
ciation, op. cit. supra note 117, at xviii-xxi.
121. But see Steefel, Enforcement of Judgments Obtained Under Statutes Typified by
the "Long Arm" and "Single Act" Statutes-Germany, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l &
Comp. L., 1964 Proceedings 239, 240.
122. 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13. For background, see Yntema, supra note 101, at 1150-63.
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FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
instructive. The development of the common law in England as to rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign judgments has been similar, but not
identical, to that in the United States.' s2 The common law rule that a fresh
action against the judgment debtor must be instituted to obtain enforce-
ment, however, is the same. Similarly, the English courts treat the foreign
judgment itself as a cause of action, so that in practice, no great hardship
is imposed upon the judgment creditor. It was recognized, however, that
this procedure was somewhat less satisfactory than the summary proceed-
ings available on the Continent, and further, "that the absence of any provision
at common law for the direct enforcement of foreign judgments makes it very
difficult to secure abroad the enforcement of English judgments, since foreign
courts, which require reciprocity, are not easily assured of the efficacy of the
common law's indirect procedure."'-24
The act, as its name indicates, emphasizes enforcement rather than recogni-
tion, although its provisions do reach the latter. As to enforcement, there are
three requirements. When a judgment of a superior court of a foreign country
which accords substantial reciprocity of treatment to British judgments (by the
terms of a convention) is final and conclusive between the parties, and given
after the entry into force of an Order of the Council extending the provisions of
the act to that foreign country, and requires the payment of money (other than
for fines or taxes), the judgment creditor may within six years apply to the
High Court for registration of the judgment. Unless the judgment has been
satisfied or is unenforceable by execution in the country of rendition, the High
Court must order the judgment to be registered. A registered judgment is
generally capable of execution in England as if it were a judgment originally
given in the court of registration.'
25
A judgment debtor may have the registration set aside if, inter alia, the
first court had no jurisdiction "in the circumstances of the case" or if notice
of the original proceedings was not received in time to enable the defendant to
defend and he did not appear, notwithstanding that service may have been
made in accordance with the law of the first state. Other mandatory grounds
for setting aside a registration are: fraud; violation of the public policy of the
forum; and the fact that the registrant is not the one in whom rights under the
judgment are vested. A registration may be set aside upon a showing that the
matter in dispute, prior to the judgment of the original court, had been the
subject of a final and conclusive judgment by another competent court.126
123. For discussions in a comparative context, see Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal
Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 619, 752-58 (1955); Nadelmann, supra note
106, at 237-42. For a discussion of the English law in the context of that of the Common
Market countries, see Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367 (1963).
124. Note, The Enforcement of Judgments: A Convention with Germany, 36 Brit.
Yb. Int'l L. 359 (1960).
125. Id. at 360-61.
126. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13,§ 4(1).
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The act also sets out criteria under which the original court shall be deemed
to have had jurisdiction and when it shall be deemed not to have had jurisdic-
tion.127 Notably, the act makes no provision for jurisdiction based on personal
service within the territorial ambit of the first court, or for citizenship, although
judgments based on either may come within the clause providing that the first
court shall be deemed to have had jurisdiction if the basis is one recognized by
the law of the registering court.128 Also, since the act makes no provision for
competence based upon a tortious act committed within the jurisdiction of the
first state, or a contract broken there, unless the defendant was a resident of or
personally served within the territory of the first state, a judgment founded on
those bases cannot be enforced in England.
129
The British practice does not stop with the 1933 Act. It had been recom-
mended by the drafters that conventions be concluded, and the recommendations
have been followed. However, after thirty years, Britain has treaties with only
six countries, including France, Belgium, and West Germany, although conven-
tions with several other European countries have been contemplated. 30 The
conventions in force assure, inter alia, the existence of a suitable degree of
reciprocity between the parties, making detailed provision for the recognition
of judgments. The effect is that qualifying judgments are to be enforced in
Britain by the method provided in the 1933 Act;' 3 ' the treaty partner is to
use its own method of enforcement. 3 2 However, the emphasis of the conven-
tions, unlike that of the act, is on recognition rather than enforcement.
133
The provisions for jurisdiction in the conventions are no more liberal than
those mentioned in the act,' s3 because England cannot enter a convention beyond
the authority granted by the act. 35 This has been compared unfavorably to
the Continental convention practice which is not limited by, and often goes
beyond, internal legislation on the subject.' 36
4. The United States Uniform Acts and the British Act Compared
There are a number of flaws in the British system, which have been
criticized by both scholars and the bench;1' 7 nevertheless, it is thought to be an
127. 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 4(2), (3). For a summary, see Yntema, supra note 101,
at 1162-63.
128. Yntema, supra note 101, at 1163.
129. Graupner, supra note 123, at 381. See also Campbell, Jurisdiction Over Absent
Defendants in English and United States Law: The Formulation of Jurisdictional Principles,
38 Tul. L. Rev. 317, 323-25 (1964).
130. Graveson, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference of Private International
Law, 14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 528, 530 (1965); Note, The Enforcement of Judgments: A
Convention with Germany, 36 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 359, at 370 (1960).
131. Note, id. at 361.
132. In the treaty with Germany, e.g., enforcement in Germany is to be by the German
method of an executory declaration. Id. at 368.
133. Id. at 364.
134. Id. at 365.
135. Graupner, supra note 123, at 380.
136. Id. at 381.
137. Id. at 373.
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improvement over the common law. It might be worthwhile, then, to determine
whether anything instructive can be gleaned from the British experience, for
application in the United States. 138
As has been noted, practice in the United States is sought to be accommo-
dated to some extent to that of the civilians by a proposed non-restrictive codi-
fication-the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. It has been
suggested that the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act and the 1964
Revision (if intended to be applicable to extra-national judgments) might,
perhaps, be more explicitly related to the Recognition Act. Whether such enact-
ments alone will mitigate the present unsatisfactory conditions is at least open
to question in the light of the British experience of codification plus treaty.
Indeed, it has been said that "the very existence of the numerous conventions
... is the best proof that legislation in the mere domestic field has been unable
to solve the problems inherent in the recognition of foreign judgments." 139
Contributing to the inherent problems are the differences between the codes and
the common law and the apparent paucity of exhaustive official and semi-official
publications in the United States on recognition and enforcement. Surely both
factors complicate proof of American law,140 a situation which codification
would go far toward rectifying. But the same may be said of conflict of laws
questions generally; in this larger area the situation has not been so noticeably
bad that wholesale codification of the common law has been suggested as a
desirable course. 14 1 The reason may lie in latent notions of sovereignty and the
dignity of nations that are more closely identified with a country's judgments
than with its law in general.142 Whatever the reason, however, it seems that the
civilians do not like, and some countries may not accept as sufficient, anything
short of mutual assurances of recognition and enforcement by treaty.14 If this
is the case, however, accession to the Continental viewpoint has been said to
be rendered difficult by the federal system of the United States. 44
The United States has entered no treaties with respect to recognition and
138. For a comparison of United States and British law, which does not include the
Uniform Acts, see Campbell, Jurisdiction Over Absent Defendants in English and United
States Law: The Formulation of Jurisdictional Principles, 38 Tul. L. Rev. 317 (1964).
139. Graupner, supra note 123, at 368.
140. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money-Judgments Abroad and What
to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 255-56 (1957).
141. Cf., on the unification of private law, Am. Bar Ass'n, Special Committee on
Unification of Int'l Private Law, Report (1961).
142. Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical
Analysis, 16 La. L. Rev. 465, 473, 478-80 (1956).
143. Graupner, supra note 123, at 368. But see Nadelmann, supra note 140, at 258,
stating that resort to the treaty-making power is not necessary as to all countries and that
statutory enactments may sometimes suffice. Germany, it has been said, is now likely to grant
recognition and enforcement to New York judgments, even in the absence of both statute
and treaty. Steefel, supra note 121, at 240.
144. For a discussion of constitutional problems with respect to the treaty-making
power as it affects the states regarding the unification of private law, see Am. Bar Ass'n,
Special Committee on Unification of Int'l Private Law, supra note 141, at 39-44 (conclud-
ing that while there is a constitutional limit to the treaty-making power, that power is
susceptible of much more extensive use).
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enforcement; indeed the ability of the federal government to conclude such an
agreement that would bind the states does not seem to be settled. Signposts in
Supreme Court decisions have been pointed out that may afford an "adequate
basis for a future ruling by the Court that 'state lines would disappear' in situa-
tions involving the judgments of foreign nations . *... "4r And it has been
suggested that constitutional complications would be avoided if treaties were
concluded by the federal government for the benefit of those states desiring to
take advantage of their provisions. To benefit from such a treaty, a state would
have to pass legislation in accordance with its provisions.140 Presumably, the
same result could be achieved if uniform legislation were first enacted by a
number of states. The federal 'government could then proceed to enter con-
ventions designed to assure recognition abroad of the judgments of American
states adopting the uniform law, while guaranteeing to the civil law countries
conclusive effect for their judgments in a manner acceptable and familiar to
them.147
5. The Hague Conference on Private International Law
In connection with the question of treaties, it would appear to be an
auspicious sign that the United States Government now participates in the
Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International (Rome)
Institute for the Unification of Private Law. Because a number of reports
regarding the Hague Conference are available, it alone will be considered here,
and the International Institute's activities will not be discussed.
One of the topics on the agenda of the Hague Conference was "recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments." A draft convention on this subject was
prepared by a special commission, on which neither the United States nor Great
Britain was represented. The result was that the draft "was prepared without
regard to any American point of view."' 48 But during the committee discussions
of the draft, "common law systems were adequately represented."'1 49 The United
Kingdom, which took a very active part in the committee deliberations, proposed
a multilateral convention which would contain general rules binding upon all
signatories, who would not thereafter be able to act contrary to them. But no
contracting party would be bound to recognize or enforce a judgment of another
unless the two had concluded a bilateral agreement to that effect.50  The United
Kingdom, basing its position on its own experience, strongly favored such a
145. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, go Colum.
L. Rev. 783, 788 (1950).
146. Nadelmann, supra note 140, at 259-60.
147. Id. at 260.
148. Nadehnann & Reese, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private In.
ternational Law, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 612 (1964).
149. Graveson, supra note 130, at 530. The article includes, as an appendix, the English
text of the Final Act of the Conference.
150. Id. at 531. See also Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Tenth Session of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law [hereinafter cited U.S. Delegation Rep.],
52 Dep't State Bull. 265, 271-72 (1965).
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system of bilateral treaties, and its suggestions are reflected in Part B of the
final draft' 11 of the session in which it is stated that "bilateralism" is worthy
of further study.152
Although no agreement was reached, largely because of lack of time,15 3
the first six articles of a proposed convention also appear in the final draft.154
These represent some signgificant developments. 55 For example, the convention
rules as to jurisdiction are to apply irrespective of the nationality of the parties, a
departure from some of the exorbitant rules on the Continent. Also, the last
article which provides that "recognition and enforcement may not be refused
for the sole reason that the court of the State of origin has applied a law other
than that which would have been applicable according to the rules of private
international law in the State addressed" is a reversal of the French law on this
subject. 56 It may be recalled, however, that civil law countries do not consider
remarkable a convention that mitigates or even derogates internal legislation
and, indeed, enter into such conventions frequently.157
Also of special interest is a provision according to which signatories may
reserve the right not to recognize judgments rendered in a proceeding in which
the requirements of natural justice, or due process of law, were not satisfied.
No such requirement had ever appeared in bilateral treaties.
5
Although current reports on the work of the Tenth Session reflect British
predominance as the representative of the common law, American participation
has only begun, and the influence of the United States delegation is more likely
to be felt during the next session. Indeed, the possibility that the question will
be raised of incorporation of a federal-state clause allowing a federal system to
151. The work of the Hague Conference is traditionally presented in the form of a
draft convention, referred to as a "Final Act." During the Tenth Session, the American
delegates urged that the conference also present its work in the form of model laws, but the
suggestion was not adopted. However, in accordance with a 1960 decision, the Final Act of
the session directs the permanent bureau to present the substance of the conventions in the
form of model laws. Nadelmann & Reese, supra note 148, at 614. Presumably the American
suggestion was an attempt to accommodate the results of the conference to a form com-
patible to both the American and Continental systems. Uniform laws are the exception on
the Continent. Nadelmann, supra note 140, at 249. By contrast, the International Law As-
sociation presented its work on recognition and enforcement in the form of a model act.
International Law Association, op. cit. supra note 117, at xvii.
152. Graveson, supra note 130, at 575-76. See also U.S. Delegation Rep. at 271-72.
153. U.S. Delegation Rep. at 271.
154. Graveson, supra note 130, at 575. These articles deal with (1) scope of applica-
tion (status, succession, bankruptcy, social insurance, taxes and penalties excluded); (2)
definition of "decisions"; (3) application irrespective of nationality; (4) conditions for
recognition and enforcement (jurisdiction of the first court, res judicata effect in first state,
enforceable in first state, and a provision for bilateral treaties respecting jurisdiction); (5)
denial of recognition and enforcement (violation of public policy, fraud, same or prior suit
pending in second state, reservation of right to deny recognition for denial of natural justice
or due process); (5 bis) provision for default judgments; (6) recognition and enforcement
not to be denied because of application of different conflicts rule from that of second state.
Id. at 575-77.
155. Id. at 532.
156. Ibid. See also infra, text at note 210.
157. Graupner, supra note 123, at 380-81.
158. U.S. Delegation Rep. at 272. The International Law Association Model Act, §
4(c) also includes a due process provision. See supra note 120.
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ratify the convention with the reservation that it will not apply to any of its
states until the federal government has given notice of extension thereto has
already been mentioned. 159
6. Long-Arm Statutes
Long-arm statutes, unlike other developments in this area, pertain only
indirectly to the problems of enforceability. However, their influence is probably
more immediately felt. 160 The effect on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in New York has already been briefly noted.1 1 In addition,
it is very likely that judgments based on such legislation will reach foreign courts
for enforcement. 62 Although long-arm statutes are properly a subject for study
in themselves, 63 for purposes of this treatment nothing more ambitious than a
very brief description of the bases of jurisdiction set out in the typical statutes
will be attempted.
The internal validity of long-arm statutes is fairly well settled: "decisional
and statutory law have given the courts a free hand to exercise jurisdiction over
nonresident individuals and foreign corporations. This result has been reached
by a construction of the due process clause which requires, for the assertion of
jurisdiction in personam over such defendants, only that they have certain
minimum contacts with the territory of the forum."' 64 Generally, long-arm legis-
lation confers upon the courts of the enacting state competence to decide cases
involving defendants not located within the state where (1) the cause of action
arises from the transaction of "any business" within the state; (2) where the
cause of action arises from the commission of a tortious act within and, in New
York, under certain circumstances without the state; 16 5 and (3) where the
cause of action arises from the ownership or use of real property by the de-
fendant within the state.166
159. U.S. Delegation Rep. at 272.
160. Nadelmann, supra note 140, at 257.
161. See supra, text at notes 74-79.
162. See Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and To.
-morrow, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 61, 64 (1965); Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l & Comp. L.,
Report of Committee on European Law, 1964 Proceedings 207-42.
163. See, e.g., Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Arn Statute: Today and
Tomorrow, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 61 (1965); Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Conse-
quences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 249 (1959); Symposiut--Jurs-
diction, Current Problems and Legislative Trends, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 345 (1959); Develop-
ments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1960).
164. Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, 50 Cornell
L.Q. 5, 9 (1964).
165. New York has recently amended its statute to provide for personal jurisdiction
over any non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act without the state which causes in-
jury to a person or property within the state, if the tortfeasor
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in the state, or(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state
and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.
N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(3).
166. N.Y. CPLR § 302 (excluding defamation from tortious acts); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.
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Underlying such enactments, and the decisions supporting them, is the
consideration that residents should not have to seek redress in a distant juris-
diction for injuries suffered in the forum caused by non-resident defendants. 167
Counterbalancing the desire to protect residents is the due process requirement
that the defendant's contact with the forum be consonant with notions of fair
play and substantial justice.16s" The doctrine of forum non conveniens is likely
to receive increased emphasis as these two interests are sought to be reconciled. 169
Relevant to the present consideration, however, is whether judgments based
on long-arm statutes will receive recognition and enforcement abroad. This
question is more properly treated in the context of the various laws in the
Common Market countries under consideration.
V. THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE COMON MARKET COUNTRIES
In the Common Market countries, whether a foreign judgment (either of a
member or of a nonmember nation) will be recognized and enforced depends
upon whether it comes within the provisions of the relevant code or of a con-
vention between the states involved. The conventions, which generally insure
reciprocal recognition and enforcement, mitigate restrictive national laws, many
of which were enacted in retaliation to the French refusal to grant conclusive
effect to foreign judgments. 70 The French practice-the revision au fond' 71
was finally ended in 1964.172 The demise of the revision au fond in France
may signal a reexamination of the national laws on recognition and enforcement
throughout Europe.1 73 However, it may be that the tendency toward convention-
making, especially as exemplified by the draft multilateral convention on juris-
diction, recognition and enforcement proposed in accordance with Article 220
of the Treaty of Rome, may more accurately foreshadow the shape of the law
110, § 17 (1963) (including contracting to insure persons, property and risks within the
state).
167. Weinstein, Trends in Civil Practice, 62 Colum L. Rev. 1431, 1435 (1962).
168. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
169. See Ginsburg, The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Obser-
vations on Current Views in the United States, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 89, 98-100 (1965).
170. See Graupner, supra note 123, at 379-81; Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of Amer-
ican Money-Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 256 (1957).
See also Weser, Litigation on the Common Market Level, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 44 (1964)
for an analysis of problems of bringing a lawsuit in one member state for which enforce-
ment will be sought in another member state under both the codes and the existing treaties
and also under the proposed multilateral treaty (draft as of June 8, 1964).
171. See authorities cited supra note 26.
172. Munzer v. Jacoby-Munzer, Cour de Cassation, (Ch. Civ., ire sect.), Jan. 7, 1964,
[1964] Bulletin des arrhts de la Cour de Cassation I. No. 15, at 11; [1964] Dalloz Juris-
prudence, [1964] Juris-Classeur Pfiodique II. 13590, with a comment by Judge Ancel (the
judge to whom the case was assigned for report), analyzed in Nadelmann, French Courts
Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments: One Down and More to Go, 13 Am. J. Comp. L.
72 (1964).
173. Nadelmann, supra note 172, at 78-79. The laws of some countries have been
undergoing examination for some time. In the Netherlands, work has been going on on
revision of the codes, Nadelmann, supra note 170, at 244, but no change seems imminent
with respect to foreign judgments, Nadelmann, supra note 172, at 79. In Germany a study
is under way with respect to the reciprocity requirement. Steefel, supra note 121, at 240.
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to come on the Continent.'1 4 In either event, as to outsider nations having no
treaty with Common Market countries, the codes will continue to be applicable.
A. Internal Rules on Recognition and Enforcement
1. Indirect Jurisdiction (Competence G~n~rale Indirecte)
In the Common Market countries, as in the United States and England,
recognition of foreign judgments is conditioned upon the proper competence of
the court of rendition. Among the members of the European Economic Com-
munity the position as to indirect jurisdiction varies. The Netherlands Code of
Civil Procedure forbids the enforcement of foreign judgments, so that the plain-
tiff must start a new suit in which the court is not bound by the findings of
the first;1 75 thus the question of jurisdiction does not arise.'1 6 Belgian law, like
that of the Netherlands, requires a treaty to exist before according conclusive
effect to foreign judgments, but only stipulates that the competence of the
foreign court must not have been founded solely upon the nationality of the
plaintiff, imposing no other requirements as to jurisdiction except that the rights
of the defense must have been safeguarded. 77 The remaining countries, Germany,
Italy, France and Luxembourg, 78 apply the standards of indirect jurisdiction. 17
Views on these standards have gradually approached uniformity'"0 and generally
agreed upon bases may be listed as including the residence of the defendant, the
court agreed upon by the contesting parties, the presence of a res within the
court's territorial ambit when the claim relates to that res, and competence
with respect to the defendant's counterclaim.' 8 ' On the other hand, certain bases
174. For discussions of various aspects of the drafts as they became known, see Graup-
ner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Western Europe, 12 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 367 (1963); Nadelmann, Common Market Assimila-
tion of Laws and the Outer World, 58 Am. J. Int'l L. 724 (1964); Weser, Conflicts of
Jurisdiction in the Common Market, 1963 J. Bus. L. 298; Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdic-
tion in the Common Market Countries, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 323 (1961); Weser, supra
note 170.
175. Nadelmann, supra note 170, at 244.
176. Graupner, supra note 174, at 373. The Netherlands has, however, entered con-
ventions under which foreign judgments are recognized and enforced. Id. at 379. For a
discussion of foreign judgments in the Netherlands, see Kollewijn, American-Dutch Private
International Law 34-38 (2d ed. 1961); see also Smit, International Res Judicata in the
Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis, infra page 165.
177. Id. at 374. See Bachrach, Enforcement of Judgments Obtained Under Statutes
Typified as "Long Arm" and "Single Act" Statutes-in Belgium, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of
Int'l & Comp. L., 1964 Proceedings 208.
178. Recognition and enforcement in Luxembourg have not received much attention
from the commentators. Whether the first court will be deemed to have had jurisdiction is
apparently conditioned upon the residence of the defendant in the first state or his submis-
sion to the competence of its court. See Graupner, supra note 174, at 379. The revision aufond has been abandoned by Luxembourg courts Nadelmann, supra note 172, at 78.
179. Graupner, supra note 174, at 374. Germany and Italy apply the "legislative fiction
of the identical norm" (indirect jurisdiction). In France and Luxembourg the principle is
of secondary importance because of the practical limitations on recognition due to Articles
14 and 15 of their respective codes. Id. at 378-79.
180. Nadelmann, supra note 170, at 261.
181. These are bases of judicial jurisdiction so frequently found in laws and conven-
tions that they might be regarded as internationally unobjectionable, desirable or relevant.
Graupner, supra note 174, at 374-75. See also supra, text at note 60.
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are generally regarded as insufficient and will not meet the tests of indirect
jurisdiction: the exorbitant bases of all the Common Market countries,18 2
competence conferred on a court to adjudicate the claim of a main defendant
against a third party, 8 3 and the transient rule of the Anglo-American systems.'8 4
2. Specific Internal Rules with Special Emphasis on Judgments Based on Long-
Arm Statutes in the United States
The practical importance of the personal service (transient) rule as an
undesirable basis may be reduced by the acceptance of "doing acts" and "trans-
acting any business" within the fora of common law jurisdictions as jurisdictional
acts. 85 The question is whether these new bases will be acceptable under the
indirect jurisdiction rules of the Common Market countries. A consideration of
this question provides a context in which to examine in more detail the laws of
the individual countries'1
8 6
Belgium, 87 as has been noted, requires a treaty based upon reciprocity
to avoid a review of the merits. If there is such a treaty, the judgment sought
to be enforced will be examined only with respect to whether: (1) it conflicts
with the Belgian ordre public (public policy); (2) it is res judicata in the
rendering state; (3) it is properly authenticated under the law of the rendering
state; (4) the rights of the defense have been safeguarded; (5) the foreign court
had jurisdiction solely by reason of the nationality of the plaintiff (in which
case exequatur will not issue). Since the United States has no treaty with
Belgium, an American judgment will be examined under the five listed require-
ments and will also be subject to a review of the merits, as to which the Belgian
courts have the widest discretion, thus retaining the practice of revision an
fond.'88
As to whether a judgment based upon a long-arm statute will pass the
182. Article 14 of the French Code Civil and the Luxembourg Code Civil is described
in supra note 53. The Belgian and Italian retaliatory measures are aimed at protecting their
nationals against countries in which they are subject to exorbitant rules. The Netherlands'
equivalent of Article 14 is not without practical significance but still in force is the provision
that a defendant without domicile or residence in the Netherlands may be sued in the
court of the plaintiff's domicile whether or not the defendant's country has or enforces ex-
orbitant bases. The German forum of the presence of assets is also described in supra note
53. Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, 10 Am. J.
Comp. L. 323, 324-28 (1961).
All of the exorbitant bases are proscribed under the preliminary draft of the Common
Market multilateral treaty on recognition and enforcement. 2 CCH Common Market
Rep. 1111 6003, 6007. Even without such a provision, however, Article 7 of the Treaty of
Rome would operate to proscribe such bases insofar as they result in discrimination based
on nationality. Nadelmann, supra note 174, at 726; Weser, supra at 328.
183. Graupner, supra note 174, at 375.
184. Nadelmann, supra note 170, at 261.
185. See Ginsburg, supra note 169, at 95; Nadelmann, supra note 170, at 261.
186. This was the topic of the Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l and Comp. L., Committee
on European Law, in 1964, before the amendment of § 302 of the N.Y. CPLR. See supra
note 165. The findings of the A.B.A. committee are digested below.
187. The following discussion, unless otherwise noted, is digested from Bachrach, supra
note 177.
188. Nadelmann, supra note 172, at 78.
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preliminary examination on the points listed, it would appear that only point
(4) might be troublesome, at least where a default judgment is in issue. Bel-
gian courts have held with respect to default judgments that where there are
compelling indications that the defendant has not been enabled to present its
defense, or has not actually received notice, the judgment is not enforceable.180
In Italy,'190 an exequatur will issue upon the institution of proceedings in
the court of appeals having jurisdiction where enforcement is contemplated,
provided that the following conditions are met: (1) the first state was qualified
to decide the case according to the principles of jurisdiction prevailing in the
Italian system; (2) service was made according to the law of the rendering
state and adequate time allowed for appearance by the defendant; (3) the
parties appeared in accordance with the law of the first state, or a default
judgment was validly issued according to the law of the first state; (4) the
judgment was res judicata in the first state; (5) the judgment is not contrary
to another decision by an Italian court; (6) no action is pending before an
Italian court involving the same parties and subject matter; (7) the judgment
does not violate Italian public policy.' 91 Since the Italian rules of competence
include as bases domicile, consent, maintenance of a place of business within the
forum, property situated in the forum to which the cause of action relates, and
obligations which have arisen or which must be performed in Italy,'1 2 there
appears to be no serious incompatibility of the long-arm statutes with Italian
laws of competence.19 3 Thus, an exequatur should issue provided the other
requirements are met.
Italy appears to be particularly liberal in the matter of enforceability,
having granted conclusive effect to all qualifying foreign judgments.'0 4 Review of
the merits is allowed only at the request of a default defendant or if Italian law
189. The slight possibility that a Belgian court might consider long-arm jurisdiction
as based upon the plaintiff's nationality, in which event the judgment would not be en-
forced, is mentioned in Bachrach, supra note 177, at 210.
190. See generally Gori-Montanelli & Botwinik, Enforcement in Italy of Judgments
Obtained Under "Long-Arm" and "Single Act" Statutes, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l &
Comp. L., 1964 Proceedings 227. For a more extensive treatment of the recognition of
judgments generally, see Cappelletti & Perillo, Civil Procedure in Italy 367-95 (1965).
191. These requirements are listed in Article 797 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and
whether they are met may be determined by the Italian court on its own motion. Cappallett
& Perillo, supra note 190, at 371.
192. Forum contractus obtains in both civil and commercial cases. Weser, supra note
182 at 331. "Obligations," however, refers also to obligations of a financial nature arising
from tort and quasi-contract. Generally, an obligation is deemed to arise in Italy if the
act that gave rise to it occurred in Italy. Cappalietti & Perillo, supra note 190 at 88. "A
tort is deemed to have taken place in Italy, if any element, including the element of loss
of profit, occurred in Italy." Ibid. This would appear to be not incompatible with
302 (a) (3) of the N.Y. CPLR. See supra note 165.
193. The prevailing view in Italy is said to be that if an Italian court, under cir-
cumstances similar to those confronting the foreign court, could have exercised jurisdiction,
the requirements of indirect jurisdiction are satisfied. Cappalletti & Perillo, supra note 190,
at 373.
194. Even where Italy has entered treaties, if its legislation is more liberal than the
treaty provisions, the legislation prevails. Cappelletti & Perillo, supra note 190, at 370, 391.
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would permit a judgment to be reopened, 9 5 the burden being upon the judgment
defendant to raise both issues.' 96
Germany, 197 by contrast, requires by statute substantial reciprocity of
treatment as a condition for recognition of all foreign judgments. United States
judgments, to date, have not met that requirement even though, in fact, German
judgments are recognized and enforced in the United States. Indeed, even Cali-
fornia, which has long had a statute providing for the granting of conclusive
effect to foreign judgments, has found its judgments unenforceable in Germany
because the degree of reciprocity was not deemed high enough.' 98 It is not
surprising, then, that New York, which does not have such a statute, has found
its judgments faring poorly in Germany. However, it has been said that if the
question arose today, "all indications are that Germany would now regard re-
ciprocity with New York as guaranteed, as a matter of German law, which, in
turn, would open the door to the recognition of New York judgments in
Germany,' 99 provided the usual minimum requirements are met.
The minimum requirements in Germany, as elsewhere, have to do with the
necessary jurisdiction of the foreign court,200 proper service of process, and non-
violation of German public policy. As to jurisdiction,2 0 ' the German code
predicates, inter alia, the place of performance of an obligation,2 02 or the place
of commission of any act in the chain of causation of a tort.20 3 As to jurisdiction,
the conclusion is, therefore, that judgments based on long-arm statutes would
be enforced by German courts if reciprocal treatment were deemed assured.
Since Germany and France have concluded no convention pertaining to
the reciprocal enforcement of judgments, Germany has not enforced French
judgments because of the French practice of revision au fond. Among the many
195. See Cappelletti & Perillo, supra note 190, at 382-83. Italian treaties on reciprocal
enforcement contain neither of these provisions. Nadelmann, supra note 170, at 245.
196. Gori-Montanelli & Botwinik, supra note 190, at 230.
197. The following discussion unless otherwise noted, is digested from Steefel, Rn-forcement of Judgments Obtained Under Statutes Typified by the "Long Arm" and "Single
Act" Statutes-Germany, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l & Comp. L., 1964 Proceedings 239.
For a summary of and a commentary on the provisions of the Zivilprozessordnung [here-
inafter cited ZPO] with respect to foreign judgments, see II Foreign Office (Gr. Brit.),
Manual of German Law 12-14 (1952).
198. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money-Judgments Abroad and What
to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 254-55 (1957).
199. Steefel, supra note 197, at 240.
200. If, under German law, German courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the mat-
ter, the foreign judgment is not enforceable in Germany. II Foreign Office (Gr. Brit.), supra
note 197, at 12.
201. The principal basis is, of course, domicile. Germany permits suit at the defendant's
residence only in the absence of -any domicile, either in Germany or abroad. Weser, supra
note 182, at 329. Of course, a defendant may also be sued where he has assets if he is neither
domiciled or resident in Germany. Id. at 327.
202. This basis obtains in both civil and commercial cases. Id. at 331.
203. Germany, like France, expressly provides for jurisdiction with respect to torts.
Id. at 332. The relevant provision is ZPO § 32, which has been liberally construed by the
German courts. Steefel, supra note 197, at 239. Like the Italian courts, German courts will
enforce a foreign judgment if a German court would have taken jurisdiction under similar
circumstances, regardless of the basis on which the foreign judgment is founded. Ibid. See
supra note 201.
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reasons urged for ridding French law of the practice, the fact that it made
French judgments unenforceable in Germany was presumably of no little con-
sequence.20 4 Developments in France had pointed for some time in this direction,
money judgments being the last area in which the practice was applied; it had
disappeared with respect to status judgments early in this century..205 The Cour
de Cassation decision of Munzer v. Jacoby-Munzer20 abolished it in non-status
matters as well.
The revision au fond first appeared in the seventeenth century code, but it
was not incorporated into the Napoleonic Codes which superseded earlier laws.
However, French courts had continued to apply the law as a part of the juris-
prudence (case law) of France.20 7 An attempt eleven years ago to codify both
reciprocity and the revision au fond was rejected.20 8 The courts proceeded to
overturn the rule-an illustration both of the underlying practical tenacity
of stare decisis in France and the ability of civil law courts to change the
law.
2 09
With revision au fond out of the way, the question arises whether recipro-
city-requiring states will now recognize French judgments. One difficulty still
standing is the apparent retention in the Jacoby-Munzer opinion of the French
rule that, in order for an exequatur to issue, the court of rendition must have
applied the governing law according to the French conflicts law. This, it is
pointed out, results in a limited revision an fond which may yet haunt French
judgments abroad; moreover, this peculiarity of French law has been criticized in
France as having no place in non-status matters, as demonstrated by the con-
ventions under which it has been limited to status judgments.2 1 0
Within the above limitations, France211 will now grant conclusive effect to
204. Revision au fond was the reason for the refusal to grant conclusive effect-on
reciprocity principles-to a French judgment in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
Professor Nadelmann has noted that the German code had accomplished what American
case law could not. Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments: One
Down and More to Go, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 72, 78 (1964).
205. Nadelmann, supra note 204, at 73. A lower court decision had forecast the end
to the practice in non-status matters in 1955. Charr v. Hazim Ulusahim, Cour d'Appel de
Paris (ire Ch.), Oct. 21, 1955, [1956J Juris-Classeur Juridique II. 9047; noted in Nadelmann,
Recognition of Foreign Judgments in France, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 248 (1956). See Nadel-
mann, supra note 204, at 74.
206. Cited supra note 172.
207. See Nadelmann, supra note 198, at 238, 242-44. For a discussion of the history
of the revision au fond to 1965, see Nadelmann, Recognition of Foreign Money-Judgments
in France, 5 J. Comp. L. 248 (1956).
208. For a discussion of the proposed codification of the French private international
law, see Delaume, A Codification of French Private International Law, 29 Can. Bar Rev.
721 (1951); Loussouran, French Draft on Private International Law and the French Con-ference on Codification of Private International Law, 30 Tul. L. Rev. 523 (1956); Nadel-
mann & Von Mehren, Some Remarks on the Proposed Codification: The Draft of the Com-
mission for the Reform of the Civil Code, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 407 (1952) (including an
English translation of the Draft Law on Private International Law).
209. Nadelmann, supra note 204, at 74, 76.
210. Id. at 77. See also the final draft of the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law, which contains a provision contrary to the French practice; see text accompany-
ing supra notes 145-56.211. The following discussion, unless otherwise noted, is digested from Freed, The En-
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judgments. However, foreign judgments, including those based upon long-arm
statutes, must pass a scrutiny of the type generally imposed: the foreign
court must meet the French tests of jurisdiction,2 1 2 the procedure must have
been regular according to the law of the rendering state, the judgment must
be in conformity with French public policy, and there must have been no evasion
of the law.
The competence of a foreign court is determined by French law. Articles
14 and 15 of the Code Civil confer exclusive competence upon the French courts
whenever the plaintiff or the defendant is a national of France. Waiver of these
privileges is, however, commonplace and is recognized by French law. Moreover,
there are exceptions to the scope of Articles 14 and 15, e.g., where the subject
matter of a lawsuit involves real property situated outside of France.2 13 Other
areas of exclusive French competence include actions in which French public or
police law is at issue; or personal property located in France is sought to be re-
covered; certain suits regarding business associations and insurance matters;
suits involving a promise made, goods to be delivered, or payment to be made in
France. French courts are also exclusively competent where the parties to a suit
have elected France as the domicile of one or both, and where the defendant was
domiciled in France at the time the action was instituted.2 14
If a judgment is without the area of exclusive French competence, before
an exequatur can issue the French court will determine whether the requirements
of indirect jurisdiction have been met.
The basic French rule is that suit is to be brought at the defendant's domi-
cile, or if none, at his place of residence. 21 5 He may also be sued at the place
where a tort was committed21 6 or, if the suit is in contract, where the promise
was made, or the goods were to be delivered, or payment to be made.217 Where
there are several defendants, all may be sued at the residence or domicile in
forceability in France of American Judgments Obtained Under American "Long Arm" or
"Single Act" Statutes, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l & Comp. L., 1964 Proceedings 212.
212. See Lorenzen, The French Rules of the Conflict of Laws, 36 Yale L.. 731, 738-
56 (1926). For a comparative study, see Castel, Jurisdiction and Money Judgments Ren-
dered Abroad: Anglo-American and French Practice Compared, 4 McGill LJ. 152 (1958).
213. If the real property is located within France, however, French courts are ex-
clusively competent. Freed, supra note 211, at 215.
214. On areas of exclusive French competence, see also Castel, supra note 212, at 180-85.
215. Suit may be brought at the defendant's residence only in the absence of any
domicile, either in France or elsewhere. Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Com-
mon Market Countries, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 323, 329 (1961). This rule is peculiar to France
and Germany, the other Common Market countries permitting suit to be brought at the
defendant's residence within the country, even if he is domiciled elsewhere.
216. Id. at 332. See also Lorenzen, supra note 212, at 740-41, 744-45. On the place of
commission of a tort, see 6 Niboyet, Trait6 de droit international priv6 frangais § 1829(1949) and 5 id. §§ 1427, 1428 (1948). In conflict of laws, French doctrine apparently
favors the place of injury. See Loussouran, supra note 208, at 537. Article 59 of the French
Code de Procedure Civil provides that actions in tort may be brought where " le fait
dommageable s'est produit."
217. This basis obtains only in commercial matters. Id. at 331. To mitigate the un-
desirable results of this restriction, France permits in certain cases that suit be brought at
the place where the agreement has been contracted or performed if either of the parties is
domiciled there. Id. at 332.
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France of one of them. As to corporations, a domestic corporation must be sued
at the siege sociale (its seat), while a foreign corporation with a branch or office
in France may be sued where it is located as to causes of action arising from
its activities in France. A foreign corporation may be sued in France for a tort
occurring there whether or not it is located or does any business in France. There
would thus seem to be little serious incompatibility between the provisions of
the typical long-arm statutes and the French rules of competence. One un-
clear area is that of the "transacting any business" provisions of the American
statutes, since the French law would appear, with the exception of torts, to
require the maintenance of a branch or other establishment in the forum. But
the making of a contract in France will subject any foreign corporation to
French competence, as will the issuance of securities in France.
It would seem, then, that Italy, France and Germany (provided reciprocal
treatment were assured in the United States) would probably not fail to recog-
nize and enforce long-arm judgments for failure to meet their jurisdictional
requirements. 218 Belgium and the Netherlands, on the other hand, would require
a treaty in order to grant conclusive effect to any judgment.
3. Treaties Among the Common Market Countries
The trend toward uniformity with respect to views on indirect jurisdiction
is due to a significant extent to the treaties concluded by European states among
themselves which have been considered necessary to overcome the great diffi-
culties involved in the recognition and enforcement of judgments. 21 0 Certainly
the attitudes on reciprocity, especially of Germany and Belgium, have posed
problems as has France's former practice of revision au fond which had generated
those attitudes. It is perhaps noteworthy that France, Belgium and Germany
are the three Common Market countries with whom Great Britain has concluded
treaties under the 1933 Act.
The network of bilateral conventions among the members of the European
Economic Community on recognition and enforcement does not include all
members. Germany and France have no treaty, nor have Germany and the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg is not a party to any convention.
220
All of the conventions that have been concluded contain stipulations of the
distinct competence of the first court.221 In addition, other prerequisites for
recognition have been specified. Fraud is sometimes set forth as a bar, as well
as the condition that the second state's public policy must not be offended;
sometimes it is provided that recognition must not be contrary to a judgment
218. Factors comprising the other requirements-such as public policy and fraud-are
too variable to permit of meaningful treatment within the scope of this paper.
219. Nadelmann, supra note 198, at 261 (on the effect of treaties); Graupner, supra
note 174, at 379 (on the necessity of treaties).
220. Ibid. For an analysis of some problems of litigation under some of the conven-
tions on recognition and enforcement currently in force, see Weser, Litigation on the Com-
mon Market Level, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 44 (1964).
221. Graupner, supra note 174, at 379.
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between the same parties rendered by a court of the second state, or even deal
with the effect of an action pending in the second state.22 2
Although the results achieved by treaty have not been uniform, they include
no provisions not already found in the common law.2 23 Of course, when no treaty
is operative, restrictive legislation often continues to hinder recognition. This
legislation and the lack of uniformity have led to the undesirable situation in
the Common Market against which Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome is directed.
The member states have been engaged in negotiations with a view to simplifica-
tion of the formalities governing the recognition and execution of judicial
decisions.
B. The Draft Multilateral Convention
Since 1959, a committee of experts from the six member states have been
working on a draft multilateral convention on jurisdiction, recognition and en-
forcement 2 4 Insofar as the draft concerns jurisdiction, it goes beyond the
strict direction of Article 220, but enough has been said to indicate that some
agreement on the principles concerning the distribution of jurisdiction is vital
to recognition and enforcement. 2 5
The preliminary draft, a translation of which has recently been published,
was adopted in Brussels by the experts in December 1964 and was submitted
to the governments of the member states and to interested parties in the com-
munity business world whose comments and opinions are expected to aid in the
preparation of a final draft.22 0 The provisions of the preliminary draft had to
a large extent been included in prior drafts which had, over the years, become
known and commented upon in England and this country. Many of the com-
ments are relevant to the preliminary draft finally submitted.22 7
The preliminary draft, of course, refers to the member states vis-h-vis one
another. It does not purport to affect the national laws of members with respect
to outsiders so that the treaty itself will not affect the treatment accorded United
States judgments under those laws. However, within the community, the pre-
liminary draft proposes important changes in internal laws concerning juris-
diction with respect to persons domiciled in the other contracting states, thus
propounding uniform rules of international jurisdiction. The result would be a
harmonization of these rules with respect to original suits in matters covered by
the treaty.228 In addition, the draft would simplify recognition and enforcement
222. Id. at 380.
223. Nadelmann, supra note 198, at 256.
224. It is perhaps significant that although Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome does
not specifically provide for a multilateral treaty, the member states have prepared one. By
contrast, in the discussions of a draft convention during the Tenth Session of the Hague
Conference (including both common law and civil law countries) the typical multilateral
convention found no supporters. U.S. Delegation Rep. at 271.
225. Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, So Cornell
L.Q. 5, 22-23 (1964).
226. 2 CCH Common Market Rep. ff 6001.
227. See authorities cited in supra note 174.
228. Weser, Conflicts of Jurisdiction in the Common Market, 1963 J. Bus. L. 298, 299.
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of judgments within its scope by setting forth uniform and concise rules both
of substance and procedure.
There are six titles, a protocol and a common declaration. The first title
deals with scope of application; the second concerns jurisdiction; the third
relates to recognition and enforcement; the fourth deals with the enforcement
of public documents; the fifth and sixth contain general and transitional pro-
visions.229
The draft's scope includes all civil and commercial matters except those of
the status and capacity of persons, legal representation, marital property systems,
gifts, succession, bankruptcy and social security.
As to jurisdiction, domicile of the defendant, irrespective of nationality, is
the basic rule. With respect to persons domiciled in a member state the rules
applicable to nationals apply, but in no event may a domiciliary of a member
state be subject to any of the exorbitant rules. As against persons not domiciled
in a member state, jurisdiction is governed by national laws. Moreover, it is
expressly provided-and this provision goes beyond the national rules on the
subject-that as against defendants not domiciled in the Common Market,
"persons domiciled in a Contracting State, regardless of their nationality, may-
like nationals of that State-invoke the rules of jurisdiction applicable in that
State, and particularly [the exorbitant rules of jurisdiction]."230 Thus, an Amer-
ican national domiciled in France would be in the same procedural position as
a French national and exorbitant jurisdictional rules could not be enforced
against him.2 31 However, the same American national could invoke Article 14,
for example, against a domiciliary of New York and obtain a French judgment
against him.232 Presumably such a judgment would be enforceable in the other
member state under the draft treaty, although probably not elsewhere. 233 The
sanction thus given the exorbitant bases has evoked some pungent comment:
"The reader may find this scheme fantastic, but who is the non-resident brother's
keeper in this type of situation?" 234
The other jurisdictional provisions are somewhat less startling. In addition
to his domicile, a defendant domiciliary of a member state may also be sued
in other member states when, inter alia, in cases of contract, the obligation was
to be fulfilled there; in cases of tort, the injury occurred there; 235 or, in case
229. The Protocol contains some special provisions, while the Common Declaration
expresses the readiness of the members to meet and explore methods of solving problems
that may arise in the application of the convention. 2 CCH Common Market Rep. 1111 6071-76.
230. Art. 4, 2 CCH Common Market Rep. ff 6008.
231. See Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367, 382 (1963); Nadelmann,
Common Market Assimilation of Laws and the Outer World, 58 Am. J. Int'l L. 724, 726
(1964).
232. Nadelmann, supra note 231, at 726.
233. Id. at 726-27 (noting also the possibility of recognition and enforcement of such
a judgment outside of the Common Market under a treaty or by reason of differences in
the rules of recognition).
234. Id. at 726.
235. The provisions respecting contract and tort make some changes in the national
laws concerning contracts, and makes explicit, in the case of torts, the laws of Belgium,
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of a dispute arising out of the operation of a branch or other establishment, the
establishment is located there. Such a defendant may also be sued at the domicile
of a co-defendant. 23 6
Special provision is made for jurisdiction under multilateral treaties and
treaties with third states. Insurance and installment contract claims are the
subject of detailed provisions.23 7 Other subject matters are relegated to desig-
nated courts having exclusive jurisdiction therefor. These include rights in rem
and leases of real property; employment contracts; matters concerning the
validity or dissolution of a company or legal person having its seat in a member
state; matters concerning administrative decisions of a member state; public
registers; patents; and in matters involving the enforcement of judgments the
courts of the place of enforcement have exclusive jurisdiction. Aside from such
cases, the right to contract that a certain court shall decide disputes between
the parties is preserved, and the court agreed upon has exclusive jurisdiction.
In addition, a court also has jurisdiction if the defendant appears before it other
than to contest jurisdiction.
A court shall ex officio declare that it lacks "urisdiction if another court is
exclusively competent, or if the defendant-domiciled in another member state-
does not appear, unless jurisdiction is established according to the rules in the
preliminary draft. Proceedings must be stayed to assure that a non-appearing
defendant has had proper notice in sufficient time to defend himself.
As to recognition, the draft states that decisions rendered in one contracting
state shall be recognized in the others without requiring a special proceeding.
But recognition shall be denied if (1) the public policy of the forum is violated;
(2) the defendant did not appear and was not properly served in time to defend;
(3) the decision for which recognition is sought is incompatible with a decision
concerning the same parties rendered in the forum; (4) a foreign decision on
preliminary questions involving matters without the scope of the convention
contravenes a provision of the international private law of the forum. Juris-
diction, which does not fall within public policy, is not to be examined unless
the judgment involves insurance, installment contracts or a question of exclusive
jurisdiction. The legality of a judgment may never be reviewed.
Enforcement may be denied only if recognition may be denied under the
draft. Decisions enforceable in the first state are enforceable in other member
states after a writ of execution has been issued upon the request of the interested
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy. See supra notes 192, 203, and 217. It is perhaps
noteworthy that the draft specifies the place of injury, rather than the place of commis-
sion of a tort or tortious act.
236. For an analysis of the problems of bringing suit against defendants domiciled in
different Common Market countries, both at present and under Art. 6, para. 1 of the Pre-
liminary Draft (a defendant domiciled in a contracting state may be sued "where there are
several defendants, before the court of the domicile of one of them"), see Weser, supra
note 220.
237. Insurance contracts and installment sales are currently the subject of "special
jurisdictions" under the national laws of most of the member states. Weser, supra note 215,
at 338.
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party. Under the draft, the' process for issuance of the writ for appeal is
made uniform. Briefly, the person requesting enforcement applies to the appro-
priate court for a writ of execution. The petitioner must conform to the law of
the enforcing state as to form and other requirements for the request even if
he must establish domicile there or designate a representative. The requested
court must rule without delay, the judgment debtor having no opportunity to
plead at this stage. If the writ is granted, the defendant has a specific time in
which to appeal to the court designated. Pending such appeal the plaintiff is
limited as to the measures he can take against the defendant's property. If the
defendant has taken an appeal in the state of rendition, proceedings in the
second may be stayed. If enforcement is denied, the judgment plaintiff may
appeal, at which time the defendant is heard. The rules respecting non-appearance
of defendants are here applicable to all defendants, whether or not domiciled in
in a member state.
The draft also sets forth uniform requirements concerning the documents
to be submitted for recognition or enforcement, but if they are not submitted,
the court has wide discretion with respect to the action it may take. But in no
case may authentication or a similar formality be required.238
VI. CONCLUSION
Events in recent years evidence an accelerated effort to improve the recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments, both in the United States and
abroad. France has changed its law and other countries are examining theirs.
Proposals in the United States have led toward the codification of the law of
recognition and more direct methods of enforcement; as yet, however, these are
exceptional measures in view of the few states that have adopted the uniform
laws. Another sautory development in this country is the more international
outlook on the part of the government, demonstrated by its participation in
multilateral conferences dealing with international cooperation in judicial
matters.
Concurrently, views on jurisdictional bases have generally become more
uniform-a most important development because jurisdiction is basic to recog-
nition. Marring this, however, is the provision of the Common Market draft
convention which not only retains exorbitant bases as against non-residents,
but extends their availability to all domiciliaries of the member states. This
is in contrast to the Anglo-American transient rule which, while it has been re-
tained, has, as a practical matter, been de-emphasized.
Whether formal agreements-as distinct from and in addition to the in-
ternal evolution of national laws-should or can be obtained in this area poses
yet further questions, not the least of which is the difficult question of form.
Proposals have run the gamut from a model act to the draft multilateral treaty
238. Compare the current practice in France pertaining to exequalur, described in
note 29, sup ra.
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of the Common Market. The Common Market is, however, something of a
special case and, as its draft now stands, it extends no direct benefits to non-
member states' judgments. It will, however, eliminate the patchwork pattern
of recognition and enforcement and unify the national laws respecting inter-
national jurisdiction among the members. Once having agreed among themselves,
these countries may be more likely to reach agreement on these matters with
non-members. And it is noteworthy that (with the glaring exception of the
"exorbitant" provision) the rules of jurisdiction the draft propounds are not
dissimilar to those generally agreed upon elsewhere.
Civil law countries both within and without the Common Market have
tended toward a system of bilateral treaties to assure for their judgments con-
clusive effect elsewhere. This system has not been wholly satisfactory, however,
and the delegates to the Hague Conference-including Great Britain which has
also concluded several bilateral treaties-are exploring the possibility of a
multilateral treaty on general principles upon which bilateral treaties would be
based, thus retaining for the signatories some measure of national autonomy
as to whose judgments would be recognized. As to any treaty, insofar as the
United States is concerned, some problems relating to the federal system must
be faced.
